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Abstract
Three Essays on Institutions and Economic Development
Sanjukta Roy
This dissertation consists of three essays that look into different types of institutions and
their relation with various aspects of economic development. The essays explore the role
of financial institutions, political institutions and the role of a free media in the context of
economic development. Chapter 2 elaborates on how foreign direct investment (henceforth
FDI) inflow into an economy can contribute towards the freedom of the institution of media.
Chapter 3 analyzes how a free media can help mitigate terrorism incidents and strengthen
a democracy for the same cause. Chapter 4 investigates how the development of financial
institutions, namely financial intermediaries, helps in deconcentration of urban centers and
promotes orderly urbanization.
Chapter 2 titled The Impact of Foreign Direct Investment on Press Freedom establishes
foreign direct investment (FDI) as a major determinant of media freedom. Global integration
can strengthen the media sector financially, make it technologically enhanced and can also
improve the economic environment as a whole. This, in turn, would work towards the
enhancement of media freedom. The sample includes high, middle and low income economies.
Using a panel of 115 countries over a period of 20 years, our results reveal that FDI is an
absolute necessity for a free and efficient media. The results are robust to various alternate
specifications and inclusion of additional control variables.
Chapter 3 titled Countering Terror: The Importance of a Free Press establishes the
importance of a free press in combating terrorism. Considering the case of transnational
terrorism, the robust empirical analysis establishes that a free press mitigates impacts of
terrorism. The analysis further substantiates that though a democracy by itself if often
criticized as being terror-inviting, when empowered by a free press, the two together has a
definite terror dampening effect.
Chapter 4, Counting on Financial Development for Urbanization examines the extent to
which the level of a country’s financial development play a contributory role in determining
the pace of urbanization nad urban concentration in different countries. The empirical
analysis spanning a 30 year period for 117 developed and developing countries show that
a higher level of financial development is associated with a lower growth in urbanization
and urban concentration. The results are found to be driven mostly by the experiences of
developing countries.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Economists have been looking deeply into the importance of “institutions” in the process of
economic development since the past five decades. The vast array of literature acknowledges
unanimously that “institutions matter”. If opening up of markets, removal of trade barriers
or providing developmental assistance (among many other processes) would have been the
only ways to put “poor” countries on the trajectory of growth and development, then why
is it that the “poor” nations still thrive to develop and the extent of their success vary
significantly across board?
It is very much therefore the fact that something else plays a crucial role in determining
the varied outcome. This missing link is primarily the quality of institutions a nation has.
A country with better institutions successfully reaps the benefits of development and grows
more than one with a poor state of institutions. Institutions have been defined in many
ways. Douglass North in his seminal work defined institutions to be the rule of the game. He
defined institutions as the “humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction”
that help reduce risk and uncertainty of human behavior. Institutions, thus defined, shape
the incentive structure and hence productivity of an economy and reduce transaction costs
of doing business. He goes ahead to state that political and economic institutions happen to
be the fundamental determinants of economic performance of a country.
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Researchers have established that countries with good institutions perform better while
bad institutions ruin all. In this context it is also worth a mention that institutions can be
broadly classified as formal and informal, though it is often difficult to distinguish between
the two. While formal institutions (as discussed above) can be categorized as political and
economic constitution, legal framework and the financial system, informal institutions are the
norms, conventions and codes of conduct that finally ensure how much of formal institutions
convert into practice. At this outset it can be mentioned that the essays in my dissertation
clearly deal with various forms of formal institutions and their impact on different aspects
of development of a nation.
It will be difficult to imagine an economy running without institutions. To minimize
or alleviate uncertainty in the world we live in, establishing good institutions are the only
way out. Efficient institutions are needed to protect property rights, to generate a favorable
investment and economic climate, to minimize or curb corruption, to create good corporate
governance practices, to mobilize allocation of savings and also to dissipate information
among masses. There are various studies which have focused on the numerous aspects of
the importance of institutions and the positive spillovers, thus, generated. The essays of my
dissertation aim to take this research further and explore the role of financial institutions,
political institutions and the role of a free media in the contexts of development. The first
two essays of my dissertation reiterate the importance of a free media as an institution. The
first essay elaborates on how foreign direct investment inflow into an economy can contribute
towards the freedom of the institution of media. The second essay analyzes how a free press
can help mitigate incidents of terrorism and strengthen a democracy for the same cause. The
third essay looks into the impact of the development of financial intermediaries in affecting
the pace of urbanization and urban concentration in various countries.
Chapter 2 titled “The Impact of Foreign Direct Investment on Press freedom” establishes
FDI as a major determinant of media freedom. Using a panel of 115 countries over a period
of 20 years, the results reveal that FDI is an absolute necessity for a free and efficient media.
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FDI in an economy strengthens all its institutions and the general socio-economic framework.
Higher levels of FDI inflow within a country has its share of positive spill-over on the media
sector as well, which is one of the most important and sensitive institutions. The spill-over
effect works by removing information asymmetry, bringing financial independence, bestowing
technological superiority, enhancing quality and reach and raising public awareness. These,
in turn, pave the way for a free and potent media. The results of the study establish FDI
inflow as an important contributor to media freedom. The higher the flow of FDI into an
economy, the free-er and more efficient is the media.
Previous literature has established how a good institutional framework brings in more
FDI in an economy. However, it may well be the case that FDI flows itself have important
implications for the institutional framework of an economy. This is even more important
given the positive impact free market institutions have on the growth of a nation, either
directly through enhancing total factor productivity or indirectly by stimulating investment.
The analysis investigates whether an increasing inflow of FDI into an economy can have a
positive spillover on its media in the sense of making it free from government stronghold. To
my knowledge, this is the first attempt to explore such causality, and thus is a significant
contribution to the existing literature on media freedom and economic development.
Since media plays a significant role in affecting a nation’s outlook, understanding of the
FDI inflow-media freedom relation is of utmost importance. The paper bases its arguments
on the premise that FDI brings in sufficient capital as well as the infrastructure for an
efficient institutional framework. “Media” being an institution should thus be affected as
well. A privately controlled media has been proved to be desirable for the welfare of an
economy (Besley and Burgess (2002); Djankov et al. (2003); Coyne and Leeson (2005)).
Presence of foreign capital spurs healthy competition in the society in general, including
the media sector, and, thus, media quality is enriched. FDI brings with it new technology,
economies of scale and global standards to look up to. It brings with it the capital to
relieve the media sector from the stringent control of the government. This would bring
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financial comfort to the sector, giving it wings for expansion, experimentation and freedom
from bias arising from any governmental financial obligation. Apart from this, presence of
privatized and international media houses themselves generates healthy competition in the
sector. This is because these private parties have an incentive to build reputation in the
foreign land as that impacts their presence globally. Thus, the mere presence of private
and foreign media would ensure a higher quality of broadcast and propagation of unbiased
information. The argument is based on a similar study by Eichenberger and Frey (2002)
where they investigate the inclusion of foreigners in supplying political services. Their study
reveals that it not only raises the supply of candidates but also raises competition which
eventually renders the domestic producers more efficient and credible. This is made possible
because the performance of internationally active policy firms in a country determines their
chance of winning in other countries. Hence, they have a bigger incentive to build up their
reputation vis--vis traditional suppliers of politics. I explore the hypothesis using a panel of
115 countries for a period of 20 years. The sample includes high, middle and low income
economies.
The hypothesis is tested using Ordinary Least square (OLS), Two-Stage Least square
(2SLS) and Ordered Probit techniques. A 2SLS approach is undertaken to account for
endogeneity issues between FDI and Press Freedom and Democracy and Press Freedom.
The Ordered Probit technique is applied to encompass a larger sample period since the data
on Press Freedom prior to 1994 is in qualitative form. For this the scores of Press Freedom
is converted into three categories - Free, Partly Free and Not Free to take the study forward.
The results support the hypothesis across various alternative specifications robustly.
While chapter 2 brings forth a determinant of a free press, Chapter 3 establishes the
importance of the free press in the context of mitigating terrorism. Titled “Countering
Terror: The Importance of a Free Press” the essay is an attempt to reestablish the importance
of a free press in the context of combating the most dreadful threat faced by countries in
current times - terrorism. Considering the case of transnational terrorism, the robust analysis
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presented above establishes that a free press does have a mitigating impact on terrorism.
The importance of the paper extends further to substantiate that, though a democracy has
often been criticized to be terror-inviting, when empowered by a free press, the two together
have a strong terror dampening effect.
The analysis is two pronged. Firstly the paper attempts to see the influence of having
a free press on future rate of terrorism. Secondly, it addresses how the same works in
conjunction with a democratic institutional set-up. So, the paper hypothesizes that a free
press will have a terror dampening effect. A free press, by disseminating information, directly
raises general awareness amongst the populace. It not only showcases the impact of such
incidents but also brings forth the root causes of the same. People become aware of the
national and international conditions associated with such fatal incidents of terrorism. The
free flow of information enables them to contextualize such incidents and make informed
decisions and form opinions on that basis. With a free press in action the authorities also
have less scope of fabricating or hiding information and this raises their accountability. This
creates a healthy environment of checks and balances. With more awareness and pressure
of accountability, the liability of the authorities to take attentive measures also rises, all of
which contribute towards combating future incidences of terrorism to a great extent. Apart
from this, a free press indirectly helps combat terrorism by empowering and enabling a
democracy.
The analysis considers a sample of 121 developed and developing countries for a period
from 1995-2004. The paper considers both panel and cross-section analysis to test the
hypothesis. The analysis is robust not only to alternate specification and both panel and
cross sectional analysis, but also to the use of alternative control variables. The strength of
the analysis also lies in the fact that not only is it tested for widely used composite proxies of
democracy, but is also been tested on proxies capturing various other aspects of democracy
and the claim remains robust throughout.
The study is not only important as it upholds the importance of having a free press and
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a sound democracy, but also establishes how important it is to empower a democracy with
a free press and this definitely has sound policy implications. This is especially for countries
weaker on either front as also for all countries plagued by threats or actual incidents of
terrorism. It also refutes the doubt that lurked about the role of a free press in dealing
with the 26/11 terror incident in India. Considering the detailed analysis, it can be safely
claimed that the free press definitely has a negative impact on future occurrences of terrorist
incidents.
In Chapter 4 “Counting on Financial Development for Urbanization” we examine the
extent to which the level of a country’s financial development plays a contributory role in
determining the pace of urbanization and urban concentration in different countries. We
hypothesize that the more developed the financial sector will be, the lower will the growth
of urbanization and urban concentration. Our argument is based on the premise that a
developed financial intermediary sector reduces transaction costs, facilitates trading, and
allows economic agents to diversify risks. This eases out locational constraints enabling
individuals to decentralize their activities.
Using a sample of developed and developing countries over the period 1975 - 2005, the
paper shows that a higher level of financial development is associated with a lower growth in
urbanization and urban concentration. The empirical analysis also concludes that the latter
result is mostly driven by the experience observed in developing countries.
Rapid urbanization in most developing countries in the past half century has been charac-
terized by excessively high levels of concentration of the urban population in very large cities.
Such large urban concentrations in developing economies are characterized by poor quality
of life, health hazards and degrading environmental concerns. Urbanization is indispensible
for the industrialization of a country, which in turn is needed for putting it on a trajectory
of growth and development. However, too much or too rapid urbanization is not desirable.
Some degree of urbanization initially reduces transaction costs and inter- and intra-regional
expenditures. But unplanned and fast paced urbanization is associated with externalities
6
such as congestion, pollution, overpopulation, etc. As the banking sector develops, especially
in developing in economies, economics agents will find it easier to carry out their economic
functions with less dependence from the city center.
The importance of the analysis not only lies in the fact that this is the first attempt
to empirically assess the effect of a developed financial intermediary sector on the rate of
urbanization or urban concentration. It is also the first attempt at a cross country analysis in
this regard. Further, the study has important policy implications as it proves that when the
financial intermediation develops, it triggers urban decongestion and enables proper urban
development, especially in developing countries.
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Chapter 2
The Impact of Foreign Direct
Investment on Press Freedom
1 INTRODUCTION
Almost all countries today realize the importance of foreign direct investment (FDI) for eco-
nomic development. FDI has been one of the major contributors in globalizing the economy.
According to an IMF report, while FDI has increased by an average of 13 percent a year
during 1990-97, it increased by an average of nearly 50 percent a year during 1998-2000.
FDI flows can have considerable impacts on the overall shaping of an economy. As a nation
becomes more integrated with the world economy, there is a huge impact on the GDP growth
rate, economic policies adopted and, most importantly, the overall institutional framework.
The important benefits of FDI, as cited in the literature, is that it generates externalities in
the form of technology transfers, creates spillover effects of knowledge and also adds to the
capital stock of an economy.
Previous literature has explored the relationship between FDI and growth. The conclu-
sions are conflicting. While one set of researchers support a positive relationship between
FDI and growth (Bosworth et al. (1999); Lipsey and Sjholm (2004)), others find that the re-
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lationship is ambiguous (Lipsey (2000)). However, a major strand of the literature seems to
agree that in the presence of sound financial institutions, greater trade openness and greater
human capital, FDI exerts a positive impact on growth (Balasubramanyam et al. (1996);
Alfaro et al. (2003); Hermes and Lensink (2003)). All these findings stress the impact FDI
has on the host country. Another strand of literature has concentrated on the determinants
of FDI flows and what kind of institutional framework is desirable for a nation to attract
greater FDI flows. Yet, the FDI flows itself may have important implications for the insti-
tutional framework of an economy. This is even more important given the positive impact
free market institutions have on the growth of a nation, either directly through enhancing
total factor productivity or indirectly by stimulating investment (Dawson (1998)).
We therefore deviate from the existing literature concentrating on FDI-growth linkage
and determinants of FDI per se, and focus on the positive spillover of FDI on a country’s
institutional framework. We choose to concentrate on a particular institution, namely the
media sector, in this regard. FDI inflows into a country, in general, can have considerable
positive spillovers on the media sector. Media - in all its form namely print, internet, tele-
vision and advertisements plays an indispensable role in informing and shaping the mindset
of an economy, be it at the local or the national level. It goes beyond being merely “cul-
tural” and is infact an “institution” which, perhaps, has the largest immediate effect on the
population at large. The indispensability of media is largely owing to its capacity to reach
people at every corner of the society. Hence it bears the brunt of channelizing information,
biased or otherwise to the beneficiaries. It has the sole potential to make the government
and businesses accountable and enable the populace to make more informed decisions.
The past decade has seen this industry as the fastest growing around the world, with
globalization catalyzing its pace. Since media plays a significant role in affecting an entire
nation’s outlook, understanding of the FDI inflow-media freedom relation is of utmost im-
portance. With no previous studies of the relationship between FDI and media, our research
makes a significant contribution in this regard. We base our arguments on the premise that
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FDI brings in sufficient capital and also the infrastructure for an efficient institutional frame-
work. “Media” being an institution should thus be affected as well. A privately controlled
media has been proved to be desirable for the welfare of an economy (Besley and Burgess
(2002); Djankov et al. (2003); Coyne and Leeson (2005)). Presence of foreign capital spurs
healthy competition in the society in general, including the media sector, and, thus, media
quality is enriched. FDI brings with it new technology, economies of scale and global stan-
dards to look up to. It brings with it the capital to relieve the media sector from the stringent
control of the government. This would bring financial comfort to the sector, giving it wings
for expansion, experimentation and freedom from bias arising from any governmental finan-
cial obligation. Apart from this, presence of a privatized and international media houses
itself generates healthy competition in the sector. This is because these private parties have
an incentive to build reputation in the foreign land as that impacts their presence globally.
Thus, the mere presence of private and foreign media would ensure a higher quality of broad-
cast and propagation of unbiased information. Our argument is based on a similar study by
(Eichenberger and Frey (2002)) where they investigate the inclusion of foreigners in supply-
ing political services. Their study reveals that it not only raises the supply of candidates
but also raises competition which eventually renders the domestic producers more efficient
and credible. This is made possible because the performance of internationally active policy
firms in a country determines their chance of winning in other countries. Hence, they have
a higher incentive to build up their reputation vis--vis traditional suppliers of politics.
We explore our hypothesis using a panel of 115 countries for a period of 20 years. The
sample includes high, middle and low income economies. The results reveal that greater FDI
flows to an economy lead to higher levels of press freedom. The conclusions distinctly stress
the need for privatization in the media industry. We confirm the findings that state’s control
over the media sector is detrimental from the development perspective. Our results are
robust with both ordinary least squares (OLS) and ordered probit specifications. Further,
we run 2SLS specifications to control for endogeneity in the specifications. The conclusions
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remain unchanged. The results are, further, robust to the addition of control variables and
alternate specifications.
Section 2 discusses the impacts of FDI on the development of the host countries. Addi-
tionally, it also charts out the impact of FDI inflows on one of the most sensitive institutions,
the media sector. Section 3 discusses the dataset used in the paper and its sources. Section
4 describes the benchmark results using an OLS specification. It also justifies the rationale
for using 2SLS specification. Section 5 presents the Ordered Probit specification and the
results. Further, it also discusses the 2SLS results. Section 6 discusses some robustness
issues. Section 7 concludes.
2 THE ROLE OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
A concrete definition of foreign direct investment is ‘the existence of a long-term relationship
between the direct investor and the enterprise and a significant degree of influence by the
direct investor and the enterprise’. Although multinational firms are the most significant
sources of foreign direct investments (FDI), a direct investor can also be an individual, a
firm or a government. During recent times, lesser restrictions on capital movements across
the world have increased the importance of foreign direct investment for the developing
world. The importance of FDI for economic development and modernization are being
realized more and more by the developing countries, emerging countries and countries in
transition. Statistics reveal that FDI flows have increased by four or five times from 1995
to 2000 amounting to an astronomical figure of 1.3 trillion US dollars. According to United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), ‘the use of locational incentives
to attract FDI has considerably expanded in frequency and value.’ During financial crisis
period of many economies, FDI flows have recovered back quickly from the depression unlike
private capital flows like portfolio and debt flows (Dadush et al. (2000); Lipsey (2001)).
Thus, these might provide developing countries with enough incentives to prefer FDI over
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other sources of private capital.
Free flow of capital is largely favored by economists due to the higher rate of return
it seeks. Foreign Direct Investment, either as Greenfield investments or Mergers and Ac-
quisitions, form a major part of this. As noted by (Feldstein (2000)), unrestricted capitals
flows have several advantages like reduction of risk faced by owners of capital through di-
versification opportunities of lending and investment, spread of best practices in corporate
governance, accounting rules and legal traditions and restricting bad policy practices by the
government through global mobility of capital. Apart from the above, there exists an ex-
tensive literature that points towards various other benefits that host countries derive from
FDI.
FDI contributes to growth in host countries through various channels. It allows the
transfer of technology, particularly in the form of new varieties of capital inputs that cannot
be achieved through financial investments or trade in goods and services. According to most
empirical research, FDI flows accelerate factor productivity and bring about income growth
for economies much more than the capacity of domestic investment. Since the firms bring
with them superior technology, there is quality enhancement for the goods produced as well
as rise in the volume (Lipsey and Sjholm (2004)). A comprehensive study by (Bosworth et
al. (1999)) provides evidence on the effect of capital inflows on domestic investment for 58
developing countries during 1978-95. The authors distinguish among three types of inflows:
FDI, portfolio investment, and other financial flows (primarily bank loans). While an increase
of a dollar in capital inflows is associated with an increase in domestic investment of about
50 cents, FDI appears to bring about a one-for-one increase in domestic investment. They
conclude that the benefits of FDI, thus, are sufficient enough to offset the evident risk of
allowing markets to freely allocate capital across borders of developing countries.
The rise in the income levels of the host country is caused by addition to the capital
stock. Studies have shown that FDI flows into Canada have led to increased capital forma-
tion (Lipsey (2000)). Lipsey (2000) did not find any significant impact on capital formation
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for other countries. Other evidences ruled out the possibility that FDI improves growth by
helping in capital formation (Borensztein et al. (1998)). They confirm that FDI is instru-
mental to economic growth by means of stimulating technological progress. They found a
positive impact of FDI on growth through technology spillover that is labor augmenting or
Harrod-neutral. Technological progress leads to knowledge spillovers which can be through
the channels of imitation, competition, linkages and/or training (Lensink and Morrissey
(2001); Barry et al. (2004), (Hermes and Lensink, 2003)). Borensztein et al. (1998) proved
that the presence of a threshold level of educated labor force is needed in recipient countries
for FDI to have a positive impact on growth. Hermes and Lensink (2003) confirmed this find-
ing using a panel of 67 LDCs. They also came up with evidence that the development of the
domestic financial system is a necessary condition for FDI to generate positive externalities
that increase output.
The impacts of FDI on trade, i.e. exports and imports, are ambiguous. A horizontal
FDI, for instance, theoretically induces a decrease in the host country’s imports and, ceteris
paribus, an improvement of its trade balance. This prediction may not hold true if the inputs
used by the foreign-owned firm are imported from abroad. Furthermore, a FDI consisting of
selling in the host country goods manufactured abroad, that is, a vertical integration forward
will have the effect of increasing the home country’s imports. MNCs are also capable of
setting up their own corporate governance systems in the sense of imposing new company
policies, internal reporting systems and rules about information disclosures and employment
of foreign managers. This may boost corporate efficiency.
There exists a dearth of literature on the impact of FDI inflow on media freedom. Pre-
vious research has proved that state control suffer from poverty, high infant mortality rates,
higher corruption and less developed capital markets (Djankov et al. (2003)). Further, for a
state controlled media, politicians get an additional edge in manipulating information reach-
ing the public and serving their private interests at the expense of the society (Coyne and
Leeson (2005)). Besley and Burgess (2002) consider the case of India, a well established
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federal democracy with a relatively free media, to establish how a free press can affect the
political economy of responsiveness. India embarked on its process of liberalization in the
1990s. Since this period, the country has seen an increasing inflow of FDI into various sectors
of the economy. Post 1990s, the media sector has also seen the entry of a plethora of private
channels in the broadcasting sector. They turned news into an essential commodity. Their
vastly improved quality, quantity and variety have given the freedom of choice to the various
section of the population. It is reasonable to assume that following the past trend, continued
inflows of FDI into the Indian economy will bring, further, freedom to the media sector.
It is expected that greater FDI flows will eventually bring forth financial comfort to
the sector and take a step forward to “free” it. A competitive, free media, both print and
electronic, will be more transparent in its activities and will posses enriched economic and
functional environment. In the presence of abundant private capital, the media outlets need
not depend on funds from the government for their functioning. This enables them not to be-
come a spokesperson for the government and frees them from the burden of circulating biased
and manipulated information. Mehfuz (2002) mentions that with the advent of privatization
of electronic media in Bangladesh, the media houses have ceased to be mere extensions of
the ‘government’s propaganda mechanism’ and are thinking freely. In Bangladesh, today
most of the leading newspapers derive 70-90% of their advertising revenue from the private
sector.
Alongside the provision of direct control as mentioned above, government also can have
a stronghold through indirect hold on media through ownership of vital infrastructural and
distributional facilities of a privately owned media-outlet. Coyne and Leeson (2008) gives
extensive examples from Romania and Vietnam where various privately owned media-outlets
were dependent on the state for infrastructure and distribution network and hence generated
biased opinions. Kassem (2002) points out that the Egyptian press is a prominent stronghold
of the government and is prime target for corruption. ‘Since the region is ruled either by
monarchies or military dictatorships that have huge budgets they can use to embellish their
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image in the media.’ A significantly high (to the proportion of 90%) of the previously
“independent” press was backed by one or more of the above-mentioned regimes. This led to
replacement of sales and marketing managers to be replaced by ‘pushy publishers’ trying to
impress the regimes’ embassies. Furthermore, the distribution figures of these publications
were also never audited and this destroyed competition. In situations like this FDI can
provide for the infrastructure and distributional facilities. From our data and Fig (2.3)
it is evident that, since 1990 FDI flows to Egypt have decreased, and the status of media
freedom has degraded from ‘partly free1 ’ to ‘not free’. Foreign capital brings with it new and
innovative technical know-how which is capable of changing the face of media infrastructure.
The superior technology would ensure trained efficient journalists, willing to take up the risk
of covering any political event. This would lead to the spread of unbiased information in
the society and contribute towards a healthy political environment. Further, the enhanced
technology will ensure rich content, unbiased viewpoint and good journalistic ethics.
Since FDI flows can ensure better corporate governance, efficient laws and criterions will
be enforced. This will definitely generate better legal environment leading to greater media
freedom. Journalists will be able to operate freely and government will have less power
to curb media operations For example, the media freedom of Zimbabwe is paralyzed by
domineering laws like LOMA and Public Order and Security Act. These violate freedom
of expression in the country (Chavunduka (2002)). As documented by him, they faced the
first of the several instances of journalist harassments in the country. Most importantly,
Zimbabwe has a history of low FDI inflows (see Fig 2.3).
3 THE DATA
The data for the study has been taken from various sources. Media freedom data is proxied
by the Freedom House Index. Freedom House’s survey data, spanning over a large time
frame, is the most comprehensive dataset available on global media freedom. The level
1Free, Partly Free and Not Free are the press freedom scores categorized qualitatively by Freedom House.
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of press freedom in each country is based on twenty three methodology questions divided
into three categories: the legal environment, the economic environment and the political
environment. The legal environment category judges laws and criterions that could influence
media contents, the ability of journalists’ to operate freely and the government’s use of
regulations to curb media operations. The degree of political control over the content of news
media forms the basis for the political environment. The economic environment includes the
structure of media ownership, transparency and concentration of ownership and the impact
of corruption and economic institutions on media. The press freedom score ranges between
0 and 100 points. The Freedom House index has assigned higher points to lower levels of
press freedom. For the convenience of analysis, the scores have been rescaled so that higher
scores denote more free environment.
The data on FDI is taken from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) database. The measure considered is FDI inflows to a country as a percentage
of GDP. Since data is available 1984 onwards, the sample period considered is 1984 to 2003.
Several explanatory variables are used besides FDI over GDP. To control for openness, we
use trade as percentage of GDP as one of the controls. Since FDI over GDP and trade over
GDP are correlated, we have taken care of the possible biasness in the estimates by running
two stage least squares later. Following Djankov et al. (2003) and Egorov et al. (2007), we
use GDP per capita as one of the major determinants of press freedom. GDP per capita is
used as an indicator of economic well being of an economy. Population can also be a major
determinant of press freedom of an economy. Since we use per capita figures for both GDP
and FDI, it allows us to take the relative country size into account and, hence, we exclude
population as one of the controls. We, instead, use population as one of the instruments in
the 2SLS specifications. Further, we use primary years of schooling as another control. It
is used as a proxy for the level of education of the population2 A higher level of education
raises the general awareness of the population . This is in accordance with the theory
2Nieswiadomy and Strazicich (2004) have shown that education is strongly related to the level of political
freedom of an economy.
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that a free media is strongly related to the demand of the public (Egorov et al., 2007).
Further, Democracy has been used from the Polity IV dataset as a proxy for institutions.
Research has shown that political institutions of an economy has important implications for
its press freedom (Djankov et al. (2003); Egorov et al. (2007)). The variable ranges from 0
to 10 with higher values representing more democratic institutions. Periods of interruption,
interregnum and transition are assigned scores of -66, -77 and -88 respectively. Such values
are excluded from the dataset. We also control for natural resource dependence in our
regressions. Egorov et al. (2007) argues that the chances of having a free press in a resource
rich country are low since the ruler has incentives to exploit the rents generated and curb
information flows. The share of natural resource exports to GDP in 1980 is used as a proxy
for natural resource dependence. Natural Resource exports are defined as the sum of exports
of primary agriculture, fuels and minerals. The data is taken from Sachs and Warner (1997)
paper. Finally, regional dummy variables have been used as additional regressors so that the
estimates are not over or under estimated by regional characteristics. The regional dummy
variables considered are Middle East and North Africa (MEN), South East Asia (SAR), East
Asia and Pacific (EAP), Europe and Central Asia (EAC), Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and
Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). A pooled OLS approach for 115 countries over
the sample period 1984 to 2003 is used. We control for time effects in our specifications.
Further, we check for robustness of the results by controlling for specific effects. We control
for corruption, infrastructure and technology in the specifications. Corruption is taken from
ICRG dataset while the rest are from the WDI database. The list of countries used in the
paper is provided in Table (2.4). A detailed description of the variables used in the paper is
provided in Table (2.5).
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4 THE EMPIRICAL CONNECTION
Since the press freedom scores are available as quantitative data from 1994 onwards, our
sample period for ordinary least squares (OLS) is from 1994 to 2003. The dependent variable
is the rescaled press freedom score for which higher values indicate a more free press. All
the variables, except democracy and schooling are standardized in terms of GDP per capita
figures. Controlling for time effects helps to control for the presence of autocorrelation in
the data to some extent . The regression specification is as follows
PFit = α0 + β1FDIit + β2Xit + β3REGIONALi + Zt + εit (2.1)
where PFit denotes the press freedom level for country i in period t,FDIit represents the
net inflow of Foreign Direct Investment as a percentage of GDP to country i in period t, X
is a vector of covariates containing the set of control variables, REGIONAL represents the
vector of regional dummies and Zt represents the vector of year dummies. The set of control
variables include Gross Domestic Production (GDP) per capita, trade openness, schooling,
resource abundance and the proxy for political institutions, democracy3.Column (1) of Table
(2.1) presents the results of the OLS regression.The results suggest that greater FDI flows
lead to a more free press. The coefficient is positive and significant at the 1% level. The
value of the coefficient suggests that a unit rise in FDI over GDP leads to a significant
increase in the value of press freedom. To express in figures, a 10 percentage point rise in
FDI leads to a 4.4 unit (or a 7.5 percentage point) rise in the extent of media freedom. This
is suggestive of the greater need of FDI in the media industry. GDP per capita is positive
and significant at the 1% level signifying that an increase in the level of GDP per capita leads
to an improvement in the press freedom situation. Resource abundance is negatively related
with press freedom but the coefficient is insignificant. Theory suggests that more resource
rich countries have poor institutions and hence are prone to having more state controlled
3The results remain unaffected when GDP growth is included as an additional control in both OLS and
OProbit specifications.
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press. Thus, greater resource abundance should lead to lower press freedom levels and this
is what the result confirms. As expected, schooling is positive and significantly related with
press freedom. Political institution has a positive and significant impact on press freedom
signifying that better institutional quality would be associated with more free press. Trade
as percentage of GDP has a positive and significant impact on press freedom indicating that
greater openness leads to a more free press. All the regional dummies, except LAC, are
significantly related with press freedom. The year dummies are insignificant. They are not
reported in Table (2.1). The R square is 0.8 which suggests that the explanatory variables
explain 80% of the variation in the dependant variable. Figure 2.1 shows the scatter plot of
FDI and press freedom. The positive slope of the trend line confirms our findings. Further,
we plot the association for the periods 1994, 1999 and 2003 separately. The association is
clearly positive for all the diagrams4
There can be potential problems of endogeneity in the model. The main variable of
interest, FDI over GDP, can be endogenous and, hence, a simple OLS would lead to biased
estimates. Domestic capitalists may block FDI flows for an economy to have control over the
press. This is evident from incidents in countries like India. Recently, government imposed
restrictions on levels of FDI which are allowed in print or broadcast. Thus, the extent of
press freedom can actually be a determinant of FDI flows into an economy.
To resolve the endogeneity problem, we run two stage least squares (2SLS)5 We use ex-
change rate, population and financial development as the instruments for FDI over GDP.
The measure used for financial development is the ratio of private credit by deposit money
bank to GDP. In the first stage, FDI over GDP is regressed on the exogenous instrument and
set of variables which also affect press freedom. These variables are democracy, schooling,
natural resource abundance, GDP per capita, and the set of regional and year dummies.
Trade over GDP is excluded due to the inherent correlation between trade and exchange
4We have not excluded the outliers from the scatter plots. The exclusion of the outliers will strengthen
the association for the different diagrams.
5Wu-Hausman test confirms the need for 2SLS. The small p value of the test suggests that OLS is
inconsistent and that 2SLS is appropriate.
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rate. To test the quality of the instruments, we have run the Sargan and the Basmann’s
tests of overidentifying restrictions. These are tests of the joint null hypothesis that the ex-
cluded instruments are valid instruments, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term and correctly
excluded from the estimated equation. We fail to reject the null due to the high p values (p
= 0.53 for Sargan’s test; p = 0.53 for Basmann’s test)6
Further, the choice of our instruments in running 2SLS has followed the methods pro-
pounded by the studies of Murray (2006)7 and Levitt (2002). The 2SLS specification is as
follows
FDIit = β0 +β1ExchangeRateit +β2Populationit +β3FinancialDevelopmentit +β4Wit +δit
(2.2)
PFit = β0 + β1 ˜FDI it + β2Xit + β3REGIONALi + Zt + εit (2.3)
Equation 2.2 represents the first stage of our 2SLS specification. FDI or Foreign Direct
Investment is the regressand. The instruments are exchange rate, population and financial
development while W contains the set of variables which also affect press freedom in equation
3, including the regional and time dummies. Equation 2.3 represents the specification of the
second stage. ˜FDI it denotes the instrumented FDI. The second stage regression results
are presented in Column (1) of Table (2.2). The results show that FDI has a positive and
significant impact on press freedom even after controlling for time and regional effects. The
coefficient is significant at the 1% level and signifies that a 10 percentage point increase in
FDI leads to a 14.9 unit rise in press freedom. Democracy, GDP per capita and Schooling
6The F test for excluded instruments is high (F (3,842=27.0)) and above usual threshold implying that
the instruments are relevant.
7Following those studies we have used alternative sets of instruments which have kept our results un-
changed and robust. As an alternative set of instruments, we use exchange rate, population and another
proxy of financial development namely the ratio of private credit by deposit money banks and other financial
institutions over GDP. Further we ran reduced form regressions by taking the instruments as explanatory
variables and the troublesome explanator as the dependent variables. Our results show that the coefficients
are significantly different from zero and have the desired signs, thus proving the credibility of the instruments.
For example, according to the established argument and intuition, exchange rate bears a negative relation
with FDI.
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have a positive and significant effect on press freedom. Resource abundance has a negative
impact on press freedom but it is not significant. All the regional dummies are significant.
The year dummies remain mostly insignificant.
Democracy may also have reverse causality problems with press freedom (Egorov et al.
(2007)). More democratic countries may be associated with more free press but it is also
possible that press freedom makes a country more democratic instead. To correct for this
endogeneity issue, we run a 2SLS specification by instrumentalizing both FDI and democracy
with the same set of instruments as before. We revalidate our choice of instruments with the
same set of tests and our choice is confirmed yet again. In fact, the p values for overidentifying
restrictions are higher this time (p = 0.90 for Sargan’s test; p = 0.90 for Basmann’s test).
Column (2) of Table (2.2) presents the 2SLS results when both the variables are instru-
mentalized. The coefficient of FDI is positive and significant at the 5% level. GDP per
capita and Democracy still have a positive and significant impact on press freedom but the
schooling variable loses its significance. Resource abundance becomes positive but is highly
insignificant. Some of the regional dummies are significant8
5 ORDERED PROBIT SPECIFICATION
The press freedom scores from Freedom House are available as quantitative data from 1994
onwards. Prior to 1994, the status of the press freedom of an economy is stated as ‘Free’,
‘Partly Free’ and ‘Not Free’. Thus, due to data constraints, we cannot check our results
over a larger sample period by a simple OLS approach. An alternative approach would
be to adopt an ordered-response model which is characterized by the indexed nature of
the outcome variable. The dependant variable is latent but a continuous descriptor of the
response. We adopt a particular type of ordered-response model, the ordered probit model.
Ordered probit is the appropriate model when the responses are ordinal and not numerical.
8To confirm our findings, we re-run the regressions by using exchange rate, population and alternative
measure of financial development as instruments. The results remain robust.
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For our model, the limited dependent variable is a dummy for press freedom. The dummy
takes three values, 0 for a not free status, 1 for a partly free status and 2 for free status.
Thus, the variable is ordinal in nature. In such a model, it is assumed that the random
errors are distributed normally. The implicit assumption of the model is that the differences
of the occurrences of free and partly free may not be the same as that of partly free and free.
The regression specification is as follows
PressDummyit = β0 + β1FDIit + β2Xit + β(3)REGIONALit + Zt + θit (2.4)
where PressDummy represents the dependant variable which is ordinal in nature. The rest
of the variable notations are same as equation (2.1). Column (2) of Table (2.1) presents
the results of the ordered probit regression. As evident from the table, the coefficient of
FDI is positive and significant suggesting that greater FDI flows increases the probability
of having a free press. Trade as percentage of GDP is significant at the 1% level. GDP per
capita, democracy and schooling have significant impacts on press freedom. Unlike the OLS
specification, some of the year dummies become significant for the probit specification. Other
then SA, the other regional dummies are significant. The likelihood ratio test statistic is the
test of overall significance of the explanatory variables. The small “p” value is suggestive of
the overall strong significance.
For a linear regression, the dependant variable is expected to change in response to a one
unit change in the explanatory variable. To interpret the impact of FDI on press freedom we
need to calculate the marginal effects. Marginal effects are calculated for each category of
the dependant dummy variable, ‘free’, ‘partly free’ and ‘not free’. The figures reveal that a
one unit increase in FDI raises the probability of having a ‘free press’ by 1 percentage points.
On the other hand, a one unit increase in FDI lowers the probability of having a ‘not free’
press by 1 percentage points. Thus, greater FDI flows always help towards the enhancement
of press freedom levels. In Figure 2.3 and 2.4, we plot the association between FDI and
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media freedom over the time period. The press dummy is represented on the primary y-axis.
The primary y-axis represents the press freedom score, 2, 1 or 0, for a particular year. The
secondary y-axis represents the FDI inflows over the years. For example, as FDI inflows
decrease from 1994 onwards for Egypt, press freedom degraded from ‘partly free’ to ‘not
free’. Cameroon has a low history of FDI inflows and, thus, the press freedom has retained
the ‘not free’ status over the entire period.
As evident from the OLS specification, there will be potential endogeneity problems
in the ordered probit specification as well. To treat the endogeneity problem, we run a
2SLS ordered probit specification. We use the same instruments as used before 9namely
population, exchange rate and financial development. In the first stage, FDI is regressed on
the exogenous instruments and a set of variables which also affect press freedom. The second
stage results are represented in column (3) of Table (2.2). The conclusion remains unchanged
with the alternate specification. The coefficient of FDI as percentage of GDP is positive and
significant at the 1% level. The low “p” value of the likelihood ratio test statistic is suggestive
of the overall strong significance. GDP loses its significance but resource abundance now has
a strong impact on the press freedom dummy. The marginal effects confirm the conclusions.
Further, we run a 2SLS specification by instrumenting both FDI and Democracy. The results
are presented in Column (4) of Table (2.2). The results are robust to the findings. FDI over
GDP is positive and significant at the 5% level.10
9As robustness checks we re-run the specifications with exchange rate, population and alternative proxy
of financial development. The results are robust.
10To confirm that the estimates are not biased downwards several alternative estimation techniques have
been adopted and the results remain consistent and robust in all. However, to formally take into account
if there is measurement error in the model the method suggested by Kmenta (1997) is used. The Kmenta
model is estimated by using various precision estimators: 0.99, 0.97, 0.95 and 0.85. The coefficient estimates
and their standard errors are nearly unchanged by this alternative specification and hence establishes the
robustness of the models.
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6 ROBUSTNESS
We run more regressions to ensure the robustness of our findings. We consider the same
FDI measure but from a different database. The alternative measure is net FDI flows as
percentage of GDP from the WDI statistics. We run both OLS and ordered probit with
the alternative measure. The results are presented in Table (2.3). Column (1) presents the
results with OLS specification while column (2) presents the results with the ordered probit
specification. As evident from the Column (1), FDI is positive and significant at the 10%
level. Trade, Schooling, Democracy and GDP have significant impacts on press freedom
levels. The results of the ordered probit specification are presented in Column (2) of Table
(2.3). The coefficient of FDI is positive but not significant11
We use an alternative measure by controlling for the total years of schooling instead
of average years of schooling. The measure is taken from Barro and Lee (2000) dataset.
The results are robust to the inclusion of the alternative measure for both OLS and the
probit specification. Further, we strengthen our findings by controlling for corruption in
the specifications. A higher level of corruption should be associated with poor institutional
quality and, thus, lower levels of press freedom. The data on corruption is taken from
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) dataset. Corruption variable is rescaled so that
higher values denote higher levels of corruption. The results are checked for both the smaller
(OLS) and the extended (Oprobit) sample. The results are robust to our findings. FDI
remains positive and significant at the 1% level for OLS but it insignificant for the ordered
probit specification. Corruption is negatively related with press freedom for OLS suggesting
that a higher level of corruption degrades the press freedom levels.
Egorov et al. (2007) control for internet penetration in their specification based on the ar-
gument that greater technological improvement should lead to greater levels of press freedom.
We check our results by controlling for both infrastructure and technological improvement
11The results are robust with 2SLS specifications. We check with alternative sets of instruments. The
results are robust with the expanded dataset.
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in our specification. The proxy used for infrastructure is number of telephone mainlines per
1000 population. The results are robust to the inclusion of the variable. FDI remains signif-
icant for the OLS specification but becomes insignificant for Ordered Probit. Infrastructure
is positive and significant in Oprobit specification, but not in OLS. The results are, quali-
tatively, similar when we control for number of television sets per 1000 people and internet
penetration.
We also check our results by running cross country regressions. The OLS regression
confirms the finding that greater FDI inflows are beneficial for the extent of press freedom
of an economy. The FDI coefficient is positive and significant at the 5% level. Further,
we check for convergence effects in our model. The results are run with cross country
regressions but with change in the values of press freedom as the dependant variable. The
dependent variable is the press freedom level of 1994 subtracted from the press freedom
level of 2003. Each country has a single observation for every variable and the independent
variable consists of the average values of the variables. The findings do not change our
conclusion. The coefficient of FDI is positive and significant showing that higher levels of
FDI leads to positive changes in press freedom levels. Further, we run our specification by
controlling for both the levels and changes in FDI. It can be possible that the changes in
FDI flows over the years matter more than the levels. The change in FDI considered is the
FDI flow in 1994 subtracted from the FDI flow in 2003. FDI average remains positive and
significant while the change is positive but not significant. This suggests that the levels of
FDI matters more for changes in press freedom levels rather than changes in the flows of
FDI.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper we establish that higher inflow of FDI to an economy has a positive spillover
effect on its media sector. It significantly enhances media freedom. FDI in an economy
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strengthens all its institutions and the general socio-economic framework. The higher level
of FDI inflow within a country has its share of impact on media sector as well, which is
one of the most important and sensitive institutions. The positive spill-over effect works by
removing information asymmetry, bringing financial independence, bestowing technological
superiority, enhancing quality and reach and raising public awareness. These, in turn, pave
the way for a free and potent media. The results establish FDI inflow as an important
contributor to media freedom. The higher the flow of FDI into an economy, the free-er and
more efficient is the media. Numerically, a 10 percentage point increase in FDI inflows leads
to 4.4 unit rise in press freedom. The results are robust to both OLS and ordered probit
specifications. Further, to control for endogeneity in the data, we run 2SLS specifications
and the conclusions remain unchanged. The results also remain robust with the inclusion of
control variables and alternate specifications.
The argument however could be better established if data on FDI inflow into the media-
sector itself could be known for economies across the world. Our future research endeavor
definitely wants to take that into account but is sadly dependent on data availability. Future
research in this area wold definitely try to fill this gap. Further, in future it will be interesting
to investigate if the impact of FDI on the quality of media is contingent on the condition of
political institution in the same. This too, is therefore a potential future research agenda.
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Figure 2.1: The Association between Foreign Direct Investment Inflows and Press
Freedom (Whole Sample))
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Figure 2.2: The Association between Foreign Direct Investment Inflows and Press
Freedom (Specific Years))
1b.pdf
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Figure 2.3: The Association between FDI and Press Freedom; Note: 0 = ’Not
Free’; 1 = ’Partly Free’; 2 = ’Free’)
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Figure 2.4: The Association between FDI and Press Freedom; Note: 0 = ’Not
Free’; 1 = ’Partly Free’; 2 = ’Free’)
2b.pdf
 
30
Table 2.1: OLS and Ordered Probit Showing Impact of FDI on Press Freedom
VARIABLES (1) (2)
FDI 0.44*** 0.03*
(0.12) (0.02)
Trade 0.04*** 0.01***
(0.02) (0.001)
GDP per capita 0.001*** 0.00003***
(0.0001) (0.000001)
Schooling 1.38*** -0.14***
(0.42) (0.03)
Democracy 4.03*** 0.16***
(0.19) (0.01)
Resource Abundance -1.56 -2.04***
(2.75) (0.37)
Dummy for Sub Saharan Africa 6.32*** -0.28*
(1.49) (0.15)
Dummy for Latin America and the Caribbean -0.44 0.36***
(1.39) (0.13)
Dummy for Middle East and North Africa -6.92*** -0.62***
(1.79) (0.16)
Dummy for East Asia and Pacific -7.85*** -0.40***
(1.38) (0.14)
Dummy for South Asia -4.52** 0.32
(2.01) (0.20)
Dummy for Europe and Central Asia -19.06*** -0.78***
(2.66) (0.19)
R-Squared 0.81 —
Pseudo R-Squared — 0.27
Observations 764 1492
Standard errors in parentheses,Year Dummies not reported
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Column 1 represents OLS specification while Column 2 represents the Ordered Probit specification
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Table 2.2: 2SLS and Ordered-Probit with 2SLS Showing Impact of FDI on Press
Freedom
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
FDI 1.71** 1.76** 0.50*** 0.20***
(0.87) (0.91) (0.16) (0.06)
GDP per capita 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0004 -0.00001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00001)
Schooling 1.26*** 0.46 -0.14*** -0.28***
(0.46) (0.62) (0.04) (0.04)
Democracy 4.50*** 5.56*** 0.21*** 0.51***
(0.26) (0.69) (0.02) (0.06)
Resource Abundance -1.49 -0.35 -3.21*** -1.23***
(6.22) (6.60) (0.76) (0.38)
Dummy for Sub Saharan Africa 5.95*** 8.99*** 0.05 0.97***
(1.95) (2.67) (0.22) (0.25)
Dummy for Latin America and the Caribbean -4.32*** -4.18*** -0.06 0.25**
(1.56) (1.54) (0.12) (0.11)
Dummy for Middle East and North Africa -5.15* 0.61 -0.01 1.50***
(2.91) (4.27) (0.28) (0.38)
Dummy for East Asia and Pacific -9.78*** -7.34*** -1.02*** 0.19
(1.71) (2.52) (0.18) (0.22)
Dummy for South Asia -5.26** -4.55* 0.75*** 0.91***
(2.43) (2.73) (0.27) (0.22)
Dummy for Europe and Central Asia -21.57*** -22.001*** -1.30*** -0.74***
(1.93) (2.003) (0.28) (0.26)
R-Squared 0.77 0.76 — —
Pseudo R-Squared — — 0.26 0.21
Observations 796 796 1701 1774
Standard errors in parentheses,Year Dummies not reported
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Column 1 and 2 represent 2SLS while Column 3 and 4 represent Ordered Probit with 2SLS
Column 1 and 3 represent the specifications with instrumented FDI
Column 2 and 4 represent the specifications with instrumented FDI and Democracy
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Table 2.3: OLS and Ordered Probit with Alternative Measure of FDI
VARIABLES (1) (2)
FDI 0.16* 0.02
(0.08) (0.02)
Trade 0.05*** 0.01***
(0.01) (0.001)
GDP per capita 0.001*** 0.00003***
(0.0001) (0.000001)
Schooling 0.89** -0.10***
(0.41) (0.03)
Democracy 3.91*** 0.16***
(0.19) (0.01)
Resource Abundance 5.27 -2.65***
(4.41) (0.33)
Dummy for Sub Saharan Africa 5.02*** -0.31*
(1.55) (0.15)
Dummy for Latin America and the Caribbean 1.49 0.31***
(1.37) (0.12)
Dummy for Middle East and North Africa -5.49*** -0.73***
(1.82) (0.15)
Dummy for East Asia and Pacific -5.75*** -0.50***
(1.49) (0.13)
Dummy for South Asia -3.34* 0.38**
(1.98) (0.20)
Dummy for Europe and Central Asia -16.45*** -0.82***
(2.86) (0.18)
R-Squared 0.79 —
Pseudo R-Squared — 0.27
Observations 832 1630
Standard errors in parentheses,Year Dummies not reported
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Column 1 represents OLS specification while Column 2 represents the Ordered Probit specification
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Table 2.4: List of Countries
Algeria Ghana Norway
Argentina Greece Oman
Australia Guatemala Pakistan
Austria Guinea-Bissau Panama
Bahrain Guyana Papua New Guinea
Bangladesh Haiti Paraguay
Barbados Honduras Peru
Belgium Hong Kong Philippines
Belize Hungary Portugal
Benin Iceland Rwanda
Bolivia India Saudi Arabia
Botswana Indonesia Senegal
Brazil Iran Sierra Leone
Burkina Faso Ireland Singapore
Burundi Israel Solomon Islands
Cameroon Italy South Africa
Canada Jamaica Spain
Cape Verde Japan Sri Lanka
Central African Republic Jordan St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Chad Kenya Sudan
Chile Korea, Republic Swaziland
China Kuwait Sweden
Colombia Lesotho Switzerland
Congo, Dem. Rep. Madagascar Syria
Congo, Rep. Malawi Thailand
Costa Rica Malaysia Togo
Cyprus Mali Trinidad and Tobago
Denmark Malta Tunisia
Dominica Mauritania Turkey
Dominican Republic Mauritius Uganda
Ecuador Mexico United Arab Emirates
Egypt Morocco United Kingdom
El Salvador Mozambique United States
Fiji Nepal Uruguay
Finland Netherlands Venezuela
France New Zealand Zambia
Gabon Nicaragua Zimbabwe
Gambia Niger
Germany Nigeria
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Table 2.5: Data Sources
Variable Source
FDI/GDP United Nations Conference in
Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
Press Freedom Index Freedom House Organization
Trade/GDP WDI (2005)
Population WDI (2005)
GDP per capita WDI (2005)
Exchange Rate Penn World Tables
Schooling Barro and Lee Dataset
Resource Abundance Sachs and Warner Dataset(1995b)
Democracy Polity IV Dataset
Corruption ICRG Dataset
Telephones (per 1000 people) WDI (2005)
Internet Penetration WDI (2005)
Financial Development Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2000) Dataset
Growth WDI (2005)
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Chapter 3
Countering Terror: The Importance
of a Free Press
1 INTRODUCTION
In the modern world, one of the most hard-pressed threat and challenge faced by all across
the globe is transnational terrorism. This phenomenon, though gained paced recently, it not
however a recent invention. As Keefer and Loayza (2008) points out, terrorism is in fact as old
as war. However, as opposed to the motives of war, the motives of terror attacks are primarily
two-fold. Firstly it tries to spread a political or social message by intimidating an audience
beyond that of the immediate victims and secondly, it has the purpose of demonstrating its
violent capability often with the goal to pressurize governments of countries. As pointed
out of Enders and Sandler (2006), they tend to broaden their audience and induce a severe
sense of anxiety in the society by making their actions appear as random. In recent years,
terrorist incidents have taken up new patterns and have shifted their targets from the military
to civilians. Alongside, the methods and planning that go behind such terror strikes have
become increasingly planned, intelligent and sophisticated. Accordingly, countering such
terror threats also require a country to be equipped with sound political and economic
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institutions as mechanisms to not only combat, but also prevent the occurrence of such
incidents.
The importance of sound institutions for growth and development of countries has been
well established in the economic literature. Studies have shown how lack of well established
economic and political institutions lead to failure of policy initiatives. In this established list
of institutions, a very addition is the consideration of media as an institution. This strand
of literature looks at the media sector as an essential anchor that, if made unbiased and
effective, can help an economy progress in its path of economic development by generating
a pool of informed and aware populace and by acting as a “handcuff” for a “leviathan
government”.
While many researchers have looked at how terrorist incidents negatively affect a coun-
try’s economic progress in a multitude of ways and have independently established various
forms of well-developed institutions as imperative for economic growth and development,
the interaction between the two has been sparsely looked at. This paper attempts to bridge
the gap in this respect and tries to investigate how a free unbiased media impacts terrorist
incidents in a country.
Section 2 provides a brief review of the literature. Section 3 elaborates on the motivation
and hypothesis. Section 4 and 5 explains the data and methodology used for the empirical
validation of the hypothesis while Section 6 elaborates the empirical results. Section 7 enlists
the robustness checks and Section 8 concludes.
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
Media, the broad reference encompassing print, internet, television and advertisements plays
an indispensable role in informing and shaping the mindset of an economy, be it at the local
or the national level. It is not merely a representation of the culture of a country but is an
“institution” that has the largest reach and the most immediate effect on the population at
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large. The indispensability of media is largely owing to its capacity to reach people at every
nook of the society. It bears the brunt of channelizing information, biased or otherwise to
the masses. It has the sole potential to make government and businesses accountable and
enable the populace to make more informed decisions.
A competitive, free media, both print and electronic, will be more transparent in its
activities and will posses enriched economic and functional environment. In the presence of
abundant private capital, the media outlets need not depend on funds from the government
for their functioning. This enables them not to become a spokesperson for the government
and frees them from the burden of circulating biased and manipulated information. Mehfuz
(2002)mention that with the advent of privatization of electronic media in Bangladesh, the
media houses have ceased to be mere extensions of the ‘government’s propaganda mechanism’
and are thinking freely. Coyne and Leeson (2008) gives extensive examples from Romania
and Vietnam where various privately owned media-outlets were dependent on the state for
infrastructure and distribution network and hence generated biased opinions. Kassem (2002)
points out that the Egyptian press is a prominent stronghold of the government and is prime
target for corruption. ‘Since the region is ruled either by monarchies or military dictatorships
that have huge budgets they can use to embellish their image in the media.’ A significantly
high (to the proportion of 90%) of the previously “independent” press was backed by one
or more of the above-mentioned regimes. This led to replacement of sales and marketing
managers to be replaced by ‘pushy publishers’ trying to impress the regimes’ embassies.
Furthermore, the distribution figures of these publications were also never audited and this
destroyed competition.
As regards the relation between quality of institutions in a country and incidents of
terrorism in the same, researchers have mostly looked at the relation between terrorism and
democracy and two contradicting perspectives exist in that regard. One perspective argue
that terrorism is supported by the higher amounts of civil liberties enjoyed in a democracy
as against autocracies. As democratic governments on average respect the privacy of its
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citizens more, counterterrorism is more difficult and more restrained. Based on findings
that democracies are more likely victims of terrorism, Eubank and Weinberg (2001) claim
that a stable democracy and terrorism go hand in hand. Blomberg et al. (2004) find that
high-income democratic nations are more prone to be international terrorist targets. The
finding is supported by Blomberg and Hess (2005). Studies by Li (2005), Burgoon (2006)
and Krueger and Laitin (2007) show that controlling for the effect of democracy, political
changes towards more democratic forms of government is associated with an increase in
terrorist activities.
The other perspective argues that democratic regimes have a terrorism reducing effect.
Eyerman (1998) indicate that stable democracies are less prone to be victims of transna-
tional terrorism. Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. (2006) also find that democracy has a terrorism
dampening effect. However, countries undergoing democratic change are more prone to ter-
rorism because of the accompanied instability during the change. Li (2005) suggests that
democracy is negatively related to international terrorism and that the trade-off between
civil liberties and security needs under such regimes need to be gauges carefully so as to
completely understand the impact of open societies on terrorism. Drakos and Gofas (2006a)
however find the democracy-terrorism linkage to be truly insignificant.
3 MOTIVATION and HYPOTHESIS
While terror struck the financial capital of India on November 26, 2008, the media of the
country gave a round-the-clock coverage of the mayhem. People, not only in the country, but
across the globe got to see the first hand evidence of atrocity which unfortunately lasted for
sixty hours. During the coverage, the media apart from giving a live update of the incident
also interacted profusely with the common man to hear out their reactions, anxiety and
grievances. The coverage was widely applauded by many but also called amateurish and
dramatic by others. It was alleged that the coverage gave terrorists an undue footage and
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also made it easier for them to use the visuals to their advantage. It was claimed that many
hostages could have been saved had the media not reported where people were hiding or
crying out for help inside the plush hotels. The involvement of the common man in voicing
their angst over the matter was also said to evoke communal repercussion. In a country like
India, where diversity is the rule, that could be dangerous. Such scathing criticisms of media
coverage prompted the News Broadcasters Association to unveil self regulatory guidelines
for telecast of sensitive events.
However, it cannot be denied that despite some of its negative effects, such coverage
brought into focus the loopholes and laxity in the country’s counter-terrorism and threat-
mitigation structure. Had it not been because of the initiative of the media, the common man
would not have truly known the intensity of the threat faced at home and the strong voices
of the people would have never ruffled the political feathers. Such was the impact that the
central government sanctioned the proposal to form the National Intelligence Agency (NIA)
in the lines of the Federal Bureau of Investigation within a day in the parliament. Further
important decisions like provision of National Security Guard nodes in all important cities
were also discussed. The home ministry was also overhauled. The incident has further led
to the promise of a new anti-terror law to be put in place. A privatized and free media along
with its role of being an unbiased informer is also understood to be driven by profit motives.
It highlights information which would have maximum appeal to the masses. In the process
the extent of broadcast does sometimes go overboard but never fails to draw the attention
of the people who have complete right to information and the freedom thereof to judge the
same. As in the case of the above-mentioned incident, despite the alleged drawbacks, the
media did play a role in being a voice for and of the people. In a free society, it did emerge as
a watchdog of the government, questioned its accountability and brought about important
policy and strategic changes thus upholding the promises of a democracy.
The above incident is a real example as to how a free media that is deemed important
for general economic development can be doubted as regards its role in combating terror
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incidents. This is what this paper tries to investigate empirically. The analysis is two
pronged. Firstly the paper attempts to see the influence of having a free press on future rate
of terrorism. Secondly, it addresses how the same works in conjunction with a democratic
institutional set-up. So, the paper hypothesizes that a free press will have a terror dampening
effect. A free press, by disseminating information, directly raises general awareness amongst
the populace. It not only showcases the impact of such incidents but also brings forth the
root causes of the same. People become aware of the national and international conditions
associated with such fatal incidents of terrorism. The free flow of information enables them
to contextualize such incidents and make informed decisions and form opinions on that
basis. With a free press in action the authorities also have less scope of fabricating or
hiding information and this raises their accountability. This creates a healthy environment
of checks and balances. With more awareness and pressure of accountability, the liability
of the authorities to take attentive measures also rises, all of which contribute towards
combating future incidences of terrorism to a great extent. Apart from this, a free press
indirectly helps combat terrorism by empowering and enabling a democracy.
4 DATA
This paper uses a cross-country framework to look at the impact of a free press on terrorism.
The proxy for terrorism has been taken from the Global Terrorism Database published by
the U.S Department of Justice. The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) is composed of
terrorist events recorded for the entire world from 1970 to 2004. The database employs
a broad definition of terrorism namely “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and
violence to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or
intimidation”. The database is designed to document every known terrorist activity across
countries and over time. This database only reports international terrorist incidents. The
proxy of terrorism used in the paper is the total number or international terrorism incidents
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in a country in a given year. The database is comparable to the other widely data source
used for empirical research in terrorism, namely, the (International Terrorism: Attribute of
Terrorist Events) ITERATE dataset (Mickolous et al. (2003); Enders and Sandler (2004)).
ITERATE dataset too enlists the number of international terrorist incidents faced by a
country. The other database used in this regard is the Global Terrorism Index of World
Market Research Center (Abadie (2006); Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008)). This however
is an index of overall threat perception for 2003-04 and not the actual number of terrorist
attacks. The benefit of using the GTD database is that it provides actual number of terrorist
incidents which is more appropriate for risk assessment purposes rather than any index of
the same.
The primary explanatory variable for the analysis is the level of media or press freedom.
The degree of press freedom of a country is captured as an index compiled by Freedom House.
The index captures three aspects: legal (laws and regulations pertaining to the media sector),
political (political pressure, control and violence on the contents of the media) and economic
(economic pressure and control on the sector). The aspects are covered by twenty-three
methodology questions. The Press Freedom Index as compiled by Freedom House originally
runs from 0 to 100 with higher scores indicating less freedom of the press. For the purpose
of analysis, the scores have been rescaled whereby higher scores now mean more free a press.
To account for the indirect impact of a free press on terrorism in the form of empower-
ing good institutions, the main proxies considered thereof are those of democracy. Firstly
an index of democracy is used for the purpose. Then the functionality of a democracy is
captured by the extent of civil and political rights offered by a nation. The paper exam-
ines the effect of a free press in conjunction with the level of democracy (captured in either
way) in impacting occurrences of terrorist incidents. For democracy the paper has used the
Vanhanen’s democratization index (VDI henceforth). The VDI is based on two dimensions,
public contestation and the right to participate, which are named as competition and partic-
ipation, respectively. Competition is based on the electoral success of the smaller parties and
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calculated by subtracting the percentage of the votes won by the largest party from 100%.
For participation, the percentage of the population that actually voted in these elections
is used as a measure. For democracy, the author constructed an equally weighted index
of democratization (henceforth democracy) by multiplying competition and participation
and dividing the outcome by 100 which the author considers as the principal indicator of
democracy (Vanhanen (1992); pp. 22-23).
For political and civil rights the paper uses indices of political rights and civil liberty
published by Freedom House. Political rights refer to the freedom of people to participate
in the political process by exercising rights to vote, organize political parties to compete
for public office, and form an effective opposition to elect representatives who devise public
policies and are accountable for their actions. Civil liberties entail freedom of expression and
religious belief, the prevalence of the rule of law, right to form unions, freedom to marry,
and freedom to travel. It also signifies the autonomy of people without interference from
the state. These two indicators provided on an annual basis are derived from cross-country
surveys. Each of these indices is measured on a scale of 1 (best) to 7 (worst) points. Following
Trumbull and Wall (1994) and Younas (2008), a combined freedom index has also been used
by adding indices of political rights and civil liberties. The combined index thus ranges from
2 to 14 with lower scores being better. While considering the econometric analysis of the
hypothesis, the analysis controls for other country-specific factors that are believed to have
a bearing on terrorism. The controls include per capita income of a country that captures
the general economic standard of a nation, literacy proxied by years of primary schooling,
infrastructure proxied by telephone mainlines per 1000 people, total population that captures
the size of the country and an index of Ethnolinguistic fractionalization capturing possibilities
of internal tension in a country. Apart from that the analysis considers an extensive set of
regional dummies Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North
Africa, Central Asia, South Asia, East Asia and the Pacific and Sub-Saharan Africa based on
standard World Bank classification. Dummies have also been included to capture whether
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a country is landlocked or an island to capture if geography has a role to play and also
considering whether a country belongs to OPEC. The study also controls for legal origin of
a country since it is established to be a determinant of the legal environment of a country
(Porta et al. (1998)). Finally share of the population belonging to religious affiliations namely
Catholics, Protestants and Islam1 has been considered.
The data for the control variables have been primarily taken from the World Development
Indicators (2007) database published by the World Bank. The dummies for landlocked/island
and the proportions of religious affiliations have been taken from Andrew Rose2 while the
legal origin dummies are based on classification by Porta et al. (1998). The data for ethno-
linguistic fractionalization has been taken from Roeder (2001).
5 METHODOLOGY
Considering that the dependent variable in this analysis is a count variable, ordinary least
square (OLS) will be inappropriate for deriving estimation results. The terrorism data shows
significant evidence of overdispersion3, whereby a Poisson count model, which assumes that
the conditional mean and standard deviation and roughly equal, is also not feasible. A
negative binomial model is thus the most appropriate for the purpose. A few considerations
suggest that the negative binomial regression works better than the alternative specification
of running a zero-inflated negative binomial model. First, the dataset inherently does not
include those years in which there was no international terror incident in a country. Also,
several important papers in this literature have relied on the negative binomial model (for
example, see Krueger and Maleckova (2003); Burgoon (2006); Krueger and Laitin (2007)).
The econometric model is specified for a sample of 121 developed and developing countries
1The value of the proportions of population belonging to religious affiliation is fixed at its 1980 values.
This is following standard (Rose (2006); Younas (2008)).
2Dr. Rose has graciously provided the datasets in his website http://haas.berkeley.edu/ arose.
3This is adjudged by the Likelihood Ratio (LR) test. The significance level of the test is adjusted
to account for the truncated sampling distribution of alpha hat. Here the results are significant and the
likelihood ratio test for overdispersion rejects the null hypothesis of alpha=0. The statistically significant
evidence of overdispersion indicates that Negative Binomial model is preferred to Poisson Regression Model.
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spanning over a period 1995-2004. The choice of sample period is based on the availability
of quantitative data for the primary independent variable of interest - press freedom. The
qualitative data on the freedom of the press as published by Freedom House starts from 1994
onwards, before that the data is in qualitative form. The econometric model followed for the
analysis also takes into account any possibility of simultaneous causation between terrorism
and the independent variables of interest. Wooldridge (2003) states that if we assume that
the error term µit is uncorrelated (a standard assumption) with all past endogenous and
exogenous variables, then lagged endogenous variables in simultaneous models are treated
as predetermined variables and they are uncorrelated with µit. Following this technique,
one-year-lagged values for all independent variables have been used.
Intuitively, this makes sense since economic, social, and political conditions may take
some time to influence a country’s vulnerability to future attacks of terrorism. Moreover, this
technique also overcomes any likely problem of contemporaneous correlation. Consequently,
in the cross-section specification data on incidents of terrorism are averaged over the period
1995 to 2004, while the data for all independent variables are averaged from 1994 to 2003.
As explained in the hypothesis, the econometric analysis addresses both the direct and
indirect impact of a free press on terrorism incidents. Accordingly, the following equations
outline the benchmark regression specification for each respectively.
TerroristAttacksit = α0 + β1PFit + β2Xit + εit (3.1)
TerroristAttacksit = α0 + β1PFit + β2Institutionsit + β3Xit + εit (3.2)
TerroristAttacksit = α0 + β1PFit + β2Institutionsit + β3(Institutions ∗PF )it + β4Xit + εit
(3.3)
Where equation (3.1) captures the direct impact of a free press on incidences of in-
ternational terrorism, equation (3.2) elucidates how prominent the impact is, given levels
of complementary good institutions. Equation (3.3) captures the impact a free press can
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indirectly have via good institutions, namely democracy. The specifications have been de-
signed following Bandyopadhyay and Younas (2009) who focus on determinants of domestic
terrorism and Chowdhury (2004) who elucidate how democracy and a free press together
help reduce corruption. In the equations, PFit is Press Freedom in country “i” at time “t”
and Xit is the matrix of other control variables of country “i” at time “t”.Institutionsit is
the quality of institutions (namely democracy and its various components)in country “i” at
time “t” and (Institutions ∗PF )it captures the interplay between good institutions and the
nature of media in country “i” at time “t”.4
6 RESULTS
As mentioned above, the paper analyzes both the direct and indirect impact of a free press
on international terrorism faced by a country. The benchmark specification followed for the
analysis is a panel analysis.
The panel analysis has been reported in tables (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3) with each table
corresponding to equations (3.1) through (3.2). Column (1) of Table (3.1) only captures
the relation between the extent of press freedom and terrorism without controlling for any
other economic or demographic attribute of a country. Column (2) and (3) includes the
variable and fixed controls accounting for other country specific characteristics and column
(4) includes ethnolinguistic fractionalization along with all the control variables. Through
all the specifications, the coefficient of press freedom is found to be negative as expected
and statistically significant as well. For interpretation of the results, marginal effects are
calculated which shows that for example, in column (4), for the press freedom index ranging
from 0 to 100, a 10 unit increase in the index would lead to a decrease in the predicted
number of terrorist events by 22.7 percent at the average.
4To ensure there is no problem of multicollinearity in the specification, the Variance Inflation Factor
(VIF)is tested for. It measures the inflation in the variances in each parameter estimate due to collinearities
among regressors. A VIF > 10 implies significant collinearity problem. In this case, the VIF estimates reveal
that none of the VIF estimates are more than 10 implying that there is no problem of multicollinearity.
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Table (3.2) follows equation (3.2). The econometric analysis pertaining to this speci-
fication captures how press freedom performs in influencing terrorism when controlled for
the quality of institution, namely democracy. In doing so, the analysis first controls for the
aggregate index of democracy (in columns 1 and 2) and then separately for its two compo-
nents: competition and participation (in column 3, 4 and 5, 6 respectively). The results show
that controlling for the aggregate condition of democracy, or controlling for the condition
of each of its aspects, the level of press freedom still has a negative coefficient statistically
significant across all specifications. As reiterated by the marginal effects, a 10 unit increase
press freedom decreases the predicted number of terrorist activities by 20 to 30 percent at
the average across specifications. Interestingly enough, the coefficients of the aggregate mea-
sure of democracy as also its individual components are seen to be positive and statistically
significant across specifications, as alleged in other literature.
Table (3.3) repeats the specification followed in Table (3.2) but substituting the extent
of political rights and civil liberties as proxies of institutional quality in a nation. Column 1
and 2 controls for the combined proxy of political rights and civil liberties, column 3 and 4
controls for civil liberties and column 5 and 6 controls for political rights. Here too, across
specifications, press freedom has a negative coefficient and has statistical significance when
controlled for the combined proxy and for political rights separately. Also, considering that
for the proxies of political right and civil liberty lower scores imply better condition, the
results show that by themselves, the combined condition of civil liberty and political right
and higher political right itself makes a country more prone to terrorist attacks. However,
the results also show that having greater civil liberties reduce terrorism (depicted by the
positive and statistically significant coefficient).
This, as also the positive coefficient in Table 3.2 for democracy and its components finds
support in the extensive literature which claim that democracy and its many aspects (like
higher political rights and civil liberty, greater participation and higher competition among
political groups) has a tendency to make a country a lucrative target for terrorists, owing
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to its flexible and tolerant environment. The diversity in opinion and action harbored by a
successful democracy makes it easier for terrorist to identify multitude of excuses to express
their displeasure. This can also be explained well in terms of India, the world largest and one
of the most successful democracies. It houses a multiparty democracy with varying degree of
political opinion and allegiance and has an extremely diverse population with varied religious
affiliations. The country also allows a free environment with tolerance towards all actions
and opinions. This very environment, while upholds the true essence of a democracy, also
more often than not, leads to various repercussions at home and outside. Many a times,
these have been the prime reasons for terrorist attacks faced by the country.
Table 3.4 captures the indirect impact of a free press on terrorism, via the channel of
a sound democracy. As specified in equation (3.3), here an interaction term is introduced
(Institutions∗PF )it. It is the coefficient of the interaction term that is the focus of attention
here. When the composite index of democracy as well as its components (competition and
participation) is considered, the interaction term has a negative and statistically significant
coefficient across specifications. This is in-keeping with the fact that the democracy score
as also for its components, higher scores are better. Table 5 does the same exercise but
considers political rights and civil liberties are proxies of a sound democracy. In this case,
considering that for the scores of political rights and civil liberties, the higher scores imply
worse condition, the coefficient of the interaction term is rightfully positive and statistically
significant.
To gain a better insight into the statistical interpretation of the specification, the partial
derivative of the dependent variable with respect to press freedom is considered:
δTerroristAttacksit
δPFit
= β1 + β2Institutionsit (3.4)
Considering the median value of the sample for the composite index of democracy and
solving for column 2 of table 3.4 reiterates that when brought together, a free press and a
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democracy together reduces terrorism. Now, the composite democracy measure runs from 0
to 24 implying that for higher values of the same (meaning a better functioning democracy),
implying that a free press will have a bigger impact in dampening terrorism as the quality of
democracy improves. The results are similar when the components of democracy (competi-
tion and participation) are considered likewise. Doing the same for column 2 of table 3.5, it
is found that considering the median value of the combined civil liberty-political right index,
the overall impact is seen to be terrorism mitigating. The above findings are encouraging
because on one hand they show that a free press has a strong indirect effect in dampening
future occurrences of terrorism, via a strong democracy. The results, on the other hand, also
depict that a free press while is effective in combating terrorism almost in all conditions, it
performs its role better, the stronger the foundation of the democratic institution. It also
shows that while left to itself a democracy can be vulnerable to terrorist attacks, a free
press can empower it further and effectively ensure a counter. The implication of the results
is clearly depicted in Figure 3.1. The figure is a graphical representation of column (2) of
Table 3.4. The figure plots how increase in the index of press freedom is related to number
of terrorist incidents in the future. For a given level of democracy, the figure clearly shows
that higher press freedom is terror dampening. The figure further reveals that as the quality
of democracy itself strengthens, the impact of a free press is strengthened as well. As shown
in the diagram, each of the three lines corresponds to three levels of democracies. As the
score for democracy increases (implying a stronger democratic institution), the slope of the
line becomes steeper meaning a greater impact of a free press.
7 ROBUSTNESS
To test the robustness of the analysis, the analysis undertakes a cross-sectional analysis. Like
the panel analysis, the crosssectional analysis also tests for the direct and indirect impact
of a free press on future occurrences of terrorism. While the panel analysis seeks to capture
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short run effects, the cross-section tends to capture the effect in the long run. Further,
the cross-section also eradicates the possibility of any “noise” that the panel data might be
capturing, since the terrorism data is random and erratic. In constructing the cross section
dataset, the dependent variable is the number of terrorist incident in the final year while the
control variables are the average of the previous years, thus maintaining the essence of the
lagged analysis and avoiding endogeneity issues. Reported in Tables 6 though 8, the cross
section results capture the direct and indirect impact of a free press. The results confirm
the previous findings, thus strengthening the claim.
An alternative index of democracy as propounded by the Polity IV Project database has
been used. The coefficients and signs of the variables of interest remain intact across specifi-
cations for the use of this alternative proxy of democracy. Thirdly, as seen in Bandyopadhyay
and Younas (2009), in place of the composite index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization, three
alternate indices of ethnic, language and religious fractionalization are introduced. These
indices range from 0 to 1 with higher values implying a higher probability that two peo-
ple selected from the same country have a higher probability of belonging to two different
groups. The data for this has been taken from Alesina et al. (2003). Both the panel and
cross-section analysis retain their sign and statistical significant with this alternative spec-
ification. In another specification the level of economic freedom of a country is controlled
for and the results remain robust. Further, a subsample is considered for only developing
countries and the results still hold robust across specifications.5
8 CONCLUSION
This paper is an attempt to reestablish the importance of a free press in the context of
combating the most dreadful threat faced by countries in current times - terrorism. Con-
sidering the case of transnational terrorism, the robust analysis presented above establishes
5To test possible non-linearity in the relation, square of the independent variables of interest were added.
However, those coefficients were statistically and economically insignificant across specifications.
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that a free press does have a mitigating impact on terrorism. The importance of the pa-
per extends further to substantiate that, though a democracy has often been criticized to
be terror-inviting, when empowered by a free press, the two together have a strong terror
dampening effect.
In isolation, a democracy seems to have a positive impact on terrorism while a free
press always has a negative impact on the same. However, when brought together, the two
has a definite negative impact on terrorism. The analysis is robust not only to alternate
specification and both panel and cross sectional analysis, but also to the use of alternative
control variables. The strength of the analysis also lies in the fact that not only is it tested
for widely used composite proxies of democracy, but is also been tested on proxies capturing
various other aspects of democracy and the claim remains robust throughout.
The analysis is not only important as it upholds the importance of having a free press and
a sound democracy, but also establishes how important it is to empower a democracy with
a free press and this definitely has sound policy implications. This is especially for countries
weaker on either front as also for all countries plagued by threats or actual incidents of
terrorism. It also refutes the doubt that lurked about the role of a free press in dealing with
the 26/11 terror incident in India. Considering the detailed analysis, it can be safely claimed
that the free press led to a positive impact at the end of it, if anything.
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Table 3.1: The Impact of a Free Press on Future Incidents of Terrorism
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Press Freedom -0.0100*** -0.0164*** -0.0209*** -0.0227***
(0.0032) (0.0047) (0.0042) (0.0047)
GDP per cap (const 2000
USD)
0.0446* -0.0054 0.0049
(0.0247) (0.0286) (0.0296)
Total Population 0.000002*** 0.000001*** 0.000001***
(0.0000004) (0.0000003) (0.0000003)
Infrastructure (per1000
people)
-0.0204* -0.0022 -0.0014
(0.0105) (0.0138) (0.00137)
Share of Gross Primary
Edu
0.0226*** 0.0109*** 0.0066
(0.0044) (0.0042) (0.0045)
Regional Dummies YES YES
Legal Origin Dummies YES YES
Landlocked Dummy YES YES
Island Dummy YES YES
Religion YES YES
OPEC Dummy YES YES
ELF 0.532
(0.383)
Constant 3.403*** 1.206*** 1.044* 1.031*
(0.197) (0.384) (0.584) (0.570)
Log Pseudolikelihood -2702.42 -2065.81 -1946.94 -1907.64
Sample Size 714 714 714 714
Standard errors in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.6: The Impact of a Free Press on Future Incidents of Terrorism, Cross
Section
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Press Freedom -0.0115* -0.0233*** -0.0294*** -0.0286***
(0.0065) (0.0082) (0.0090) (0.0095)
GDP per cap (const 2000
USD)
0.0621 -0.0069 -0.0142
(0.0437) (0.0497) (0.0497)
Total Population 0.000003* 0.000001 0.000001
(0.000002) (0.000001) (0.000001)
Infrastructure (per1000
people)
-0.0184 0.0210 0.0238
(0.0184) (0.0277) (0.0285)
Share of Gross Primary
Edu
0.0187** 0.0135* 0.0130*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Regional Dummies YES YES
Legal Origin Dummies YES YES
Landlocked Dummy YES YES
Island Dummy YES YES
Religion YES YES
OPEC Dummy YES YES
ELF -0.288
(0.471)
Constant 3.124*** 1.477*** 0.206 0.166
(0.396) (0.679) (0.916) (0.876)
Log Pseudolikelihood -421.61 -388.98 -359.63 -351.52
Sample Size 119 119 119 119
Standard errors in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.9: List of Countries
Albania Ethiopia Nigeria
Algeria France Pakistan
Argentina Ghana Peru
Armenia Greece Philippines
Australia Guatemala Poland
Austria Guinea Romania
Azerbaijan Guyana Russia
Bahrain Haiti Rwanda
Bangladesh Honduras Saudi Arabia
Belarus Hungary Senegal
Belgium India Sierra Leone
Benin Indonesia Somalia
Bolivia Ireland South Africa
Bosnia-Herzegovina Israel South Korea
Botswana Italy Spain
Brazil Jamaica Sri Lanka
Bulgaria Japan Sudan
Burundi Jordan Sweden
Cambodia Kenya Switzerland
Cameroon Kuwait Syria
Canada Laos Tajikistan
Chad Latvia Tanzania
Chile Lebanon Thailand
China Liberia Togo
Colombia Lithuania Trinidad and Tobago
Costa Rica Macedonia Tunisia
Cote D’ Ivoire Malaysia Turkey
Croatia Mali Uganda
Cuba Mauritania Ukraine
Cyprus Mexico United Kingdom
Czech Rep. Morocco United States
Dem. Rep. Congo Mozambique Uruguay
Denmark Myanmar Uzbekistan
Djibouti Namibia Venezuela
Dominican Rep. Nepal Vietnam
Ecuador Netherlands Yemen
Egypt New Zealand Zambia
El Salvador Nicaragua Zimbabwe
Estonia Niger
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Table 3.10: Summary Statistics
sum stat 2.pdf
 
Variables Mean Standard Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Total # of Terrorist Incidents  18.34 41.99 1 519 
Press Freedom Index     
Democracy (VDI) 17.00 13.06 0 43.22 
 Competition 40.94 23.46 0 70 
 Participation 33.59 19.19 0 67.47 
Democracy (Polity IV Database) 5.69 3.85 0 10 
Political Rights 3.64 2.14 1 7 
Civil Liberty 3.90 1.76 1 7 
 Political Rights-Civil Liberty Combined 7.54 3.83 2 14 
GDP Per Capita 8.18 8.97 0 34.83 
Total Population (in billions) 68565.44 186431.9 565.51 1288400 
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Index 0.45 0.27 0.003 0.922 
Economic Freedom Index (Heritage) 58.41 10.96 23.65 81.19 
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Figure 3.1: Impact of levels of Press Freedom on Incidents of Terrorism (for given
levels of democracy)
e3 1.pdf
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Figure 3.2: Scatter Plot of Raw Data: Level of Press Freedom and Number of
Terrorism Incidents)
e3 2.pdf
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Chapter 4
Counting on Financial Development
for Urbanization
1 INTRODUCTION
Urbanization, despite being a long studied concept, is yet to be explored comprehensively.
The most interesting aspect of urbanization is that it gives rise to two very varied yet im-
portant consequences. While on one hand it gives rise to agglomeration benefits, it also
generates social, environmental and administrative challenges like public sanitation prob-
lems, inadequate housing, traffic congestion and crime. While the agglomeration benefits of
urbanization arises from and reinstates reduction in transaction costs, it also fosters exchange
of ideas and technology thus enabling itself to protect local economies from sector-specific
shocks. However, alongside these benefits that urbanization brings along, one cannot ignore
its ill-effects. Rapid urbanization and concentration leads to an increase in the informal
sector, raises urban poverty, increases urban slums, generates scarcity of resources like hous-
ing and other amenities thus spiraling urban real estate prices and leading to inadequate
infrastructural facilities.
In wealthier nations, urban areas account for a greater share of national GDP than in less
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developed countries. Additionally, studies have documented how changes in urbanization
levels reflect changes in the proportion of GDP generated by and the proportion of the
workforce in industry and services. In other words, a country urbanizes as its economy
and workforce become more centered on industry and services. In its 2008 report, the
Commission on Growth and Development affirmed that no country has ever industrialized
without also urbanizing. And another integral part of an industrialized economy is a sound
financial system, especially well-functioning financial intermediaries or the banking sector.
As mentioned earlier, urbanization is triggered by an attempt to reduce transaction cost.
Well developed financial intermediaries reduce transaction costs too, thus furthering the
goal of urbanization. This paper is an attempt to elaborate this idea of how financial
development, especially with regards to financial intermediaries can impact urbanization
outcomes in nations.
In what follows, we elaborate on the existing literature on urbanization and financial
sector development in section 2. In section 3 we elaborate on the hypothesis, section 4
describes the data used to analyze the hypothesis empirically. In section 5 we provide a
detail analysis of the raw data, while in section 6 we explain the results of our econometric
analysis. Section 7 concludes.
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
Financial Development is an integral component of the growth process of an economy. Deep-
ening of the sector promotes economic growth by mobilizing investment and lifting returns
to financial resources, which in turn raises productivity. Development of financial interme-
diaries helps lower the cost of researching potential investors, exerting corporate controls,
managing risk and mobilizing savings. The allocation function of institutions was first noted
by Schumpeter (1934), who conjectured that bankers help to identify entrepreneurs with
good growth prospects whereby helping to reallocate resources to their most productive
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uses. By providing such services to the economy, financial intermediation influences sav-
ings and allocation decisions in ways that has the potential to alter long run growth rates.
The relationship between financial sector development and economic development has been
extensively studied by Shaw (1973), Demetraides and Hussein (1996), Levine (1997), and
Arestis et al. (2001), to name a few. According to Gallego et al. (2002), financial systems
can develop efficiently in terms of financial depth captured by bank liquid liabilities to GDP.
Schumpeter (1934), Rajan and Zingales (1998), Beck et al. (2000a), Hsu and Lin (2002),
Bolbol et al. (2005), and Yu and Gan (2010) find support that banking sector development
being positively related to short and long term economic growth.
Alexander Hamilton (1781) argued that “banks were the happiest engines that ever were
invented” for creating economic growth. The indispensable role of financial system has been
accepted by economists (King and Levine (1993a), King and Levine (1993b)). Levine (1997)
re-established the importance of efficient financial markets during recent times. Development
of the financial sector promotes growth and development of a nation through a variety of
well established channels. Financial development can make foreign aid work better for aid
recipient countries (Nkusu and Sayek (2004)). Further, Beck (2002) has proved that countries
with an effective financial sector have a comparative advantage in manufacturing industries.
It is commonly agreed that a developed financial system promotes economic develop-
ment by channelizing resources efficiently, mobilizing savings, reducing information asym-
metry problems, facilitating trading, hedging, pooling and diversification of risk, aiding the
exchange of goods and services and monitoring managers by exerting corporate control. In
this paper we seek to identify an unexplored route through which financial development
could affect growth, namely the development of urban centers. Levine et al. (2000) identifies
that legal and accounting reforms that strengthen creditor rights, contract enforcement and
accounting practices boost financial development and accelerates economic growth. Neusser
and Kugler (1998) and Rousseau and Wachtel (1998) find that financial development Granger
causes economic development in time series of growth and financial development. An inno-
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vative event study by Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) show that when individual states of the
United States relaxed intra-state branching restrictions, the quality of bank loans increased
and per capita GDP growth accelerated. A growth in size of financial intermediaries (both
in terms of physical locations and total assets) enables it to be more efficient and hence
offers a broader range of services to its customers (both lenders and borrowers). As noted
by Rousseau and Wachtel (1998), the size of the intermediating sector reflects the volume of
its services as also increases in the efficiency of their delivery. Their study also finds that a
rapidly growing intermediation sector improves both resource allocation and economic per-
formance. From the above discussion it is evident that while financial sector development is
amply established to be a determinant of economic growth and development in general, it
also has very important implications for the development of local economies.
Just like financial development is an important aspect of economic growth and develop-
ment, so is urbanization. Urbanization is said to be the most important and enduring motive
in stimulating consumption and investment. It also simultaneously propels economic and
social development. Along with industrialization, urbanization also spurs social progress in
education and key technologies. From the perspective of developmental history of countries
around the world, urbanization is a logical choice for spurring economic and social devel-
opment. The degree of urbanization is not merely an indicator of national strength and
international competitiveness, but indeed a milestone of human progress itself.
Economic development and urbanization has a logical and inextricable linkage. The
close connection between urban and national economic growth was recognized by Lucas
(1988) and was inspired by the development of endogenous growth models. Urbanization
is the consequence of changes in national output and composition from rural agricultural
to urbanized modern manufacturing and services production. This process is a feature not
only of the developing countries but can also be noted in peri-urban regions of developed
countries. Urbanization promotes benefits from agglomeration such as localized information
and knowledge spillovers and thus efficient urbanization promotes growth. Gallup et al.
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(1999) suggest that urbanization may ’cause’ growth, rather than just emerge as a part of
the growth process.
There is however limited evidence in this regard so as to make a firm assertion. Hen-
derson (2004) too finds no evidence linking the extent of urbanization to either economic
or productivity growth or levels. Ades and Glaeser (1995) on that other hand finds that
urbanization has a negative impact on GDP per capita growth. They explain it by saying
that large cities create rent seeking activities and instability instead of spurring long run
growth. Moomaw and Shatter (1993) does not confirm to this finding. Their study, in fact,
shows that the concentration of urban population in large cities is growth augmenting.
In the backdrop of the established importance of financial development and urbanization
in their respective roles in inducing growth and development, we contribute by investigating
if financial development can be a contributory factor determining the extent of urbanization
itself. The results of the analysis would be a significant contribution to the literature as a
study on this association has never been attempted before.
3 HYPOTHESIS
While urbanization is indispensible for the industrialization of a country and is needed for
putting it on a trajectory of growth and development, too much or too rapid urbanization
is not desirable. As Henderson (2004) notes, some degree of urbanization is desirable ini-
tially to reduce transaction costs and inter- and intra-regional expenditures. But unplanned
and fast paced urbanization is associated with externalities such as congestion, pollution,
overpopulation, etc. In fact, in developing countries the latter is the situation more often
than not. Rapid urbanization in most developing countries in the past half century has been
characterized by excessively high levels of concentration of the urban population in very
large cities. Such large urban concentrations in developing economies, as noted earlier, are
characterized by poor quality of life, health hazards and degrading environmental concerns.
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Henderson (2004) explains that developing countries face the negative impacts associated
with urbanization more than that was faced by developed nations primarily due to the pace of
urbanization in these developing economies. Developed countries, he observes, urbanized at a
more “leisurely” pace. The United States was urbanized 70 percent in 1960 and 75+ percent
in 1990. This gradual pace, combined with high GDP allowed time for the development of
economic and political institutions conducive for sustaining an efficient form of urbanization
and a reasonable quality of life. This stands in sharp contrast with the urbanization pace
of developing nations which is not only much higher but also much less paced out. The
latter, combined with weak economic and political institutions and lower GDP, make urban
concentrations unsustainable. As Henderson notes, it is more like a “crash course, leaving
little room for timely experimentation and adjustment”. Given such situation, the main
concern for countries, especially developing countries across the globe is to adopt policy
measures so as to decongest the mega urban centers of its pressures and make them more
sustainable. In this connection, we suggest that the development of the country’s financial
system, especially, financial intermediaries, would help alleviating overconcentration of cities
and promote more orderly development and urbanization.
The financial development-urbanization nexus is a potentially untapped area of research.
As mentioned earlier much work has concentrated on how financial development and urban-
ization are independently important for growth. A vast array of literature also looks into
the various determinants of urbanization. However, no study has been done so far to see if
financial sector development in itself can result in urban agglomeration. Given that urban-
ization contributes towards growth and development, it would be important to determine
if urbanization is a channel through which financial development impacts the growth and
development of a nation.
Becker (2006) studies the connection between city size and financial development mainly
in the light of stock market development. He finds that city size is a robust determinant of
stock market size and activity but not of other types of financial development (like banks) and
69
that countries with large cities have a better developed stock market. Addressing the spatial
nature of financial services, Parr and Budd (2000) note that organization and development
of financial services have strong spatial dimensions that impact the urban system. Dehejia
and Lleras-Muney (2005) look at the effect of state-level banking regulation on financial
development and on components of state-level growth in the United States from 1900 to
1940. Though not the focus of the paper, yet a significant finding of the study reveals
that financial development in the United States during 1900-1940 led to considerable bank
branching whereon the various states went on to become more populous and more urban.
They find that among 11 states that never adopted branching, 8 remained agricultural. This
is evidence enough to look into the link between financial development and the process of
urbanization, a fact not verified yet in the literature. Buckley et al. (2009) also note that
a well developed financial market would complement a well functioning real estate market
which in turn would strengthen the sustainability of the urban centers.
Earlier studies have looked into various factors that lead to urban agglomerations in a
country. Moomaw and Shatter (1996) state that as economies develop, relative and absolute
demand change in favor of industrialization. This is manifested through the growth of
manufacturing and services sector, which tend to concentrate in urban centers. Further,
internal economies of scale, localization benefits of urbanization and transportation costs
raise the advantage of urban centers in terms of both production and consumption and
hence promote further urbanization. Studies have emphasized that by virtue of increasing
productivity, it is natural for urbanization to be accompanied by economic development.
Bairoch (1988) and Todaro (1979) address an interesting character of urbanization in the
context of developing nations. They argue that urbanization or growth of cities in developing
nations are largely due to population explosion and artificially higher wage rates in cities
as against only due to productivity rise as pointed by others. They consider urbanization
in the developing world as mostly being “excessive”. Wheaton and Shishido (1981) find a
non-linear relation between urban concentration and GNP per capita. Their result show that
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urban concentration increases with increasing level of GNP per capita until a middle level of
development. After that the relation becomes negative. Ades and Glaeser (1995) point out
how government plays a role in determining the population of the largest city. They argue
that government uses spatial tax policies to exploit the population. By applying favorable
policies to bigger cities, the government enhances its own survival.
We contribute to the literature thus discussed above by considering if the initial level
of financial sector development plays a contributory role in determining the pace of urban-
ization and urban concentration in countries. We hypothesize that the more developed the
intermediary sector will be, the lower will the growth of urbanization and lower will be the
rate of urban concentration. Therefore, when the financial intermediary sector is less de-
veloped, countries face agglomeration, but as the sector improves, the countries experience
deconcentration. Our argument is based on the simple premise that a developed financial
intermediary sector reduces transaction costs and brings in more transparency in the pricing
mechanism of the market. This eases out locational constraints faced by individuals and
businesses, enabling them to decentralize their activities. This also complements the fact
that urbanization itself is triggered by the necessity to reduce transaction costs. Hence when
the banking sector develops, people find it easier to carry on their economic functions without
having to stay in the city center. When a higher level of financial development is reached, a
process of suburbanization begins. This is mainly because, when countries embark on their
process of financial sector improvement, it gets initiated in more populous places first. This
in turn makes those populous centers more attractive for other businesses and draws more
people from other parts of the country in search of better and more opportunities. However,
once a moderate level of financial sector development is attained, spillover effects occur. The
spillovers are in terms of the spread of a developed financial market all over the country
and not just at specific urban centers. When such a stage is reached, it is no longer needed
for businesses and the populace to flock only into cities to reap the benefits of a developed
financial sector. It is then that the impact of financial sector development on urbanization
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starts showing a decline.
4 DATA
The paper uses a cross country framework to look into the implication of financial devel-
opment on urbanization. The analysis considers 117 developed and developing countries
(enlisted in Table 4.5) over the period 1975 to 2005.
The share of liquid-liability to GDP is chosen as the proxy to address development of
financial intermediaries, the independent variable of interest. Liquid Liability as a share of
GDP (LLY henceforth) is a traditional measure of financial sector development. It is the
liquid liabilities of the financial system and is currency plus demand and interest-bearing
liabilities of financial intermediaries and nonbank financial intermediaries as a percentage of
GDP. This is the broadest available indicator of financial intermediation, since it includes
all three financial sectors (central bank, commercial bank and other financial institutions).
It is a typical measure of financial “depth” and thus of the overall size of the financial sector
without distinguishing between the financial sectors or between the use of liabilities1. It
indicates the degree of monetisation with respect to the real economy.
As observed by Beck et al. (2002) there exists very wide variation in this indicator. On
one extreme there are countries with trillions of USD such as Japan and the U.S, on the
other extreme there are small and poor countries with financial systems smaller than the size
of one small bank in developed countries. The general consensus is that higher values of this
indicator are associated with higher levels of financial development. The data for financial
development has been taken from the financial database compiled by Beck et al. (2002). This
database is the most comprehensive database available on various indicators addressing the
different aspects of a financial sector and is extensively used in the literature. The choice of
this proxy for a developed financial sector (with regards to its role of intermediation) finds
1We acknowledge the fact that there are other proxies that capture the development of the financial
intermediary sector. But we have not included them in our study because the alternative variables are
weakly correlated with LLY showing that the proxies do not capture the same aspect.
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ample support in previous literature. It has been persistently used as a measure the size of
the financial intermediaries in seminal researches by King and Levine (1993a), Levine (1997),
Levine et al. (2000), Benhabib and Spiegel (2000) and is always used in current literature
addressing financial sector development and its various economic impacts.
The dependent variable of interest, urbanization, has been proxied in multiple ways. This
includes measures that capture both extent of urbanization as well as the extent of urban
concentration. For capturing the extent of urbanization, the most common measure the share
of urban population relative to total population has been used. While this measure captures
the general state of urbanization in an economy, other measures focus on urban concentration
and look at the pressure on larger urban centers compared to the total urban population. To
account for urban concentration, three alternate measures commonly used in the literature
have been used. The first measure of urban concentration is the Hirschman-Herfindahl index
of concentration, which is constructed by squaring the share of population apportioned to
each city in the national urban population and summing those squares Wheaton and Shishido
(1981). The second measure is the relative urban primacy which is the share of population
contained in largest city in a national urban population Ades and Glaeser (1995). The third
measure of urban concentration is urban gigantism which is the share of population contained
in a country’s largest city relative to its total population (Gustavsson (1999); Moomaw and
Alwosabi (2007)).
At the outset, it should be emphasized that the four measures of urbanization capture
different aspects of the same. While the proportion of urban population relative to total
population indicates how much of the population in a country is located in urban areas, the
relative urban primacy and the Hirschman-Herfindahl (HF) indices capture how much of the
existing urban population is concentrated in the bigger cities. Urban gigantism, on the other
hand, captures exclusively how much of the total population of a country is concentrated in
the largest city of the same. Given the different implications of these alternative measures
of urbanization, it would not be prudent to expect financial development to have identical
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implication across board.
The data for urban percentage, relative urban primacy and urban gigantism is from the
World Development Indicators database (WDI,2007). The Hirschman-Herfindahl index is
constructed based on data from World Urbanization Prospects, 20072. The World Urban-
ization Prospects defines urban agglomeration as the de facto population contained within
the contours of a contiguous territory inhabited at urban density levels without regard to
administrative boundaries. It usually incorporates the population in a city or town plus that
in the sub-urban areas lying outside of but being adjacent to the city boundaries. The choice
of dataset pertaining to each proxy of urbanization or urban concentration follows previous
literature by Moomaw and Shatter (1996), Moomaw and Alwosabi (2007) and Henderson
(2004).
Besides the main explanatory variable, we control for other parameters in our benchmark
analysis. They are GDP per capita, export as a share of GDP, value added of the agricultural
sector as a share of GDP, net inflow of FDI as a percentage of GDP. We also control for
infrastructural condition in a country. Following Moomaw and Shatter (1996) and Moomaw
and Alwosabi (2007), we control for communicative infrastructure in a country, namely,
provision of telephone mainlines per 1000 people. The data for this is taken from (WDI,2007)
database. Further, the analysis incorporates regional dummies to avoid region-specific bias
in the results. Following standard World Bank classification, the regions controlled for in
the analysis are East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the
Caribbean, Middle east and North Africa, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.
The choice of the other control variables follows directly from Moomaw and Shatter
(1996). They use GDP per capita and sector contributions to GDP as explanatory variables
2The World Urbanization Prospect considers population of urban agglomerations with 750,000 inhabitants
or more. A drawback associated with using the measures of urban concentration is data restriction especially
due to lack of data on population in the largest cities for many nations, especially the island countries.
However, as noted by Moomaw and Alwosabi (2004), there is no other source that the data can be gathered
from apart from the two sources used in this paper and hence the analysis needs to be carried on keeping
in mind the missing data. For a similar reason Moomaw and Alwosabi (2004) uses 30 countries for their
analysis.
74
for urbanization. They argue that economic development would cause urbanization firstly
because of the associated division of labor with market growth and development of commu-
nication and transportation and secondly due to a shift in sectoral importance away from
agriculture towards industry. Following the same argument we incorporate the variables
GDP per capita and value added of the agricultural sectors in our analysis.
FDI inflow as a percentage of GDP is included in the analysis as a potential explanator
for the extent of urbanization. FDI directly causes industrialization and indirectly spurs
entrepreneurial activities both of which leads to creation of urban centers in countries. FDI
can also be a proxy for the extent of openness of an economy. In that context it can lead
to creation of transportation nodes which generally occur primarily in urban centers and
also lead to increased demand for marketing, financing and communication Mills and Songs
(1979). Elizondo and Krugman (1998) however argues that more openness reduces size of
large cities unlike a closed economy since the increased accessibility of industrial firms to
international markets frees them from the necessity to be concentrated in any one urban
center in particular. Share of export to GDP is incorporated as a measure of openness of a
country (Moomaw and Shatter (1996)) as is expected to reduce urban concentration.
5 EVIDENCE FROM RAW DATA
Before proceeding with the econometric analysis, we do a detail investigation of the raw data.
To begin with, we rank the countries first in terms of the proxy of financial development. The
data reveals that developed countries have the higher values of liquid liability over GDP while
the developing countries have lower score of the same. However, some developing nations
like Malaysia, South Africa, and Singapore do have high scores of the financial development
proxy as some developed countries like Iceland and New Zealand have low scores of the same.
In a similar way we rank the countries according the scores of the urbanization proxies3 too.
3The summary statistics for the whole sample and the sub-samples of developing and developed countries
are given in Table 4.6.
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For the measure urban population as a share of total population as also for the other three
proxies of urban concentration, it is mostly the developed countries that are ranked higher
in terms of their situation in the initial year of the sample period. However, when ranked
according to the growth rates of urbanization, the developing countries take precedence.
The above conclusions suggest that countries that start off with less developed financial
intermediaries experience higher rates of urbanization and urban concentration. To explain
this more clearly, we plot the simple correlation between the growth in different measures of
urbanization and the initial level of financial development. In Figure 4.1 we consider the case
of urban population relative to total population. In the horizontal axis we plot the values of
the initial LLY of countries while on the vertical axis is plotted the growth of urbanization
of the same4. The fitted quadratic trend line shows a clear downward slope, implying that
in general if a country starts off with a high level of LLY, it shows a lower growth rate of
urbanization. If the x-y space would be divided into four quadrants, it is clearly visible that
all the developed countries lie in the lower right corner of the graph showing high level of
financial development and lower growth of urbanization. In Figure 4.2 we show the scatter
plot for H-F index of urban concentration. For the entire sample the scatter plot does not
show an clear trend in this case. When in Figure 4.3 we plot the growth of relative urban
primacy we however get a U-shaped trend line implying that with higher levels of LLY,
relative urban primacy declines up to a point but then increases. In Figure 4.4 we repeat
the same for urban gigantism and here it shows a very distinct declining trend for the entire
sample of developed and developing countries.
Now, to analyze the data further, we do the same for the subsamples of developing and
developed countries separately. Figure 4.5 through 4.8 represent the scatter plots for the four
alternative proxies of urbanization for the developing countries only while Figure 4.9 through
4.12 does the same for developed countries. The scatter plots reveal that for the subsample
of developing countries, higher levels of financial development is unanimously associated
4We consider log of all variables for the purpose of the analysis.
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with low urbanization (or urban concentration). However, the case for the sub-sample of
developed countries is interesting. Growth in urbanization for developed counties show a
U-shaped relation, implying that up to a certain point, a high level of financial development
is associated with lower growth of urbanization or deconcentration, but at very high levels
of financial development, growth of urbanization and urban concentration goes up. This
goes on to say that developed countries with very high levels of financial sector development
are primarily urban. Further, as noted by Ottens and Henk (1990) in the context of the
Netherlands, this is a reiteration of the fact that with regards to high levels of financial
development, developed countries are at a different phase of urbanization. He explains that
while urbanization sets in a country, with development of various complementary factors (like
economic growth, infrastructural development etc), an initial phase of urban concentration is
followed by rapid urban deconcentration where countries successfully relocate their growing
urban population in satellite cities. However, at very high levels of development with market
forces in action, socio-cultural changes and new planning strategies, a new phase of urban-
revitalization sets in. This view is also reiterated by Antrop (2000) in the context of western
European countries. In the next section we conduct econometric analysis to substantiate
what the raw data reveals.
6 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
To test our hypothesis empirically, we perform a cross-section and pooled regression analysis.
The cross-section analysis spans over the years 1975-2005 and the panel is constructed using
10 year intervals. Hence for the panel analysis, each country has three data points. As for the
dependent variable, for cross-section, the growth in urbanization is calculated between 1975
and 2005, while for the 10-year panel analysis the growth in urbanization are considered for
the periods between 1975 and 1985, 1985 and 1995 and 1995 and 2005. To account for any
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biasness due to potential outliers we engage in robust regression analysis5. Our benchmark
specifications are as follows:
GrowthinUrbanProxyit = α0 + β1InitialLevelofUrbanProxyit + β2InitialFDit
+β3DummyforDevelopedCountries ∗ InitialFDit + β4Xit + εit
(4.1)
GrowthinUrbanProxyit = α0 + β1InitialLevelofUrbanProxyit + β2InitialFDit
+β3InitialFD
2
it + β4DummyforDevelopedCountries ∗ InitialFDit
+β5DummyforDevelopedCountries ∗ InitialFD2it + β6Xit + εit
(4.2)
Equations (4.1) and (4.2) are used for analyzing the entire sample of 117 countries for
both cross section and panel analysis. The same equations are used for all four proxies of ur-
banization. GrowthinUrbanProxyit gauges the growth in the proxy of urbanization between
the final and the initial year for country “i” at time “t”. InitialLevelofUrbanProxyit refers
to the initial level of the proxy of urbanization for country “i” at time “t” and InitialFDit
represents the initial level of financial development of country “i” at time “t”. InitialFD2it
refers to the square of the same. Xit is the vector of control variables pertaining to country
“i” at time “t” and εit is the error term. For all the control variables, we consider the initial
values and the logarithms of the same.
Tables (4.1) and (4.2) represent equations (4.1) and (4.2) for the cross-section of the entire
sample. The results in table (4.1) reveal that across the alternative proxies of urbanization,
a higher initial value of LLY is associated with a lower growth in urbanization even after
controlling for all other economic and demographic factors. All the coefficients also have
5Robust regression is the best way of dealing with outliers. Since outliers are not data entry errors and
hence there is no reason to exclude these data points from the analysis. In fact robust regression is the best
alternative between deleting these points, and allowing them to violate the assumptions of OLS regression.
However, for robustness, we have already use quantile regression technique that considers the median rather
than the mean of the dependent variable. The results remain robust in both cases, confirming the robustness
of the results.
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statistical significance. In the analysis, since a dummy has been used to account for developed
countries, GDP per capita is not used separately. The analysis also reveals that higher initial
values of the urban proxy also lead to lesser growth in urbanization.
As regards to the other coefficients, the interaction term for the initial level of LLY and
the developed country dummy as also the developed country dummy itself have a positive
coefficient, as expected. This reiterates the scatter plots for developed nations that revealed
that very high values of LLY are associated with higher urban growth in developed nations.
Further, as expected, higher share of exports to GDP has a positive coefficient implying that
higher trade openness lead to higher urbanization, higher level of communication infrastruc-
ture have a negative coefficient (implying urban deconcentration) as does higher FDI inflows
as a share of GDP. Higher contribution of the agricultural sector to GDP should mean a
less industrialized economy and hence less urban. So we ideally expect a negative coefficient
as is found for the proxies of urban population in relation to total population and urban
gigantism. But for the H-F index of urban concentration and relative urban primacy the
coefficient is positive. This can be explained that primarily agricultural economies typically
have fewer big cities and hence as the economy develops, people and businesses typically
flock into those cities.
The results in table (4.2) are similar. However the results do show that the square of
LLY has a negative coefficient across all four proxies but has statistical significance only
for the share of urban population and urban gigantism. Tables (4.3) and (4.4) repeat the
same exercise but for the 10 year panel and the results are similar. In the panel analysis
however, it is relative urban primacy and urban gigantism that has statistically significant
coefficients with regards to the square of LLY in table (4.4). To check the presence of
quadratic relation with regards to LLY, we check the specification for the sub-samples of
developing and developed countries. For the developing countries the square of LLY has a
negative and statistically significant coefficient across the four proxies. For the sub-sample
of developed countries, LLY and the square of it have a positive and significant relation.
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To explain the results more clearly, as a representation, we plot the regression outcomes
only for the first proxy of urbanization: share of urban population relative to total. This is
depicted in Figure 4.13 through 4.16. In 4.13, we plot the specification for the whole sample
pertaining to equation (4.2). It shows that as the level of initial LLY increases, the growth
in urbanization declines, until a very high level of initial LLY is reached, whereby an upward
trend sets in. Figure 4.14 plots the specification for the whole sample again, but now without
the cross terms with the developed country dummies and we get a similar plot. In figure
4.15, we plot the regression outcome for the sub-sample of developing countries including the
square of LLY. The plot shows a very distinct negative plot. This implies that the range of
initial LLY that the sample of developing countries have, they face a declining urban growth
or deconcetration. When the same plot is repeated in figure 4.16 for the sample of developed
nations, the plot is upward sloping, as expected.
The detailed analysis reveals that a developed financial intermediary sector serves the
purpose of deconcentrating urban locations. A well developed financial intermediary sector
is associated with lower growth of urbanization and lower growth of urban concentration.
The fact that the result are driven by the developing countries bear testimony to the fact
that developing the financial intermediaries are a viable policy for the countries to ease out
urban congestion and allow proper development of the same.
To check the robustness of the results, a number of alternatives are considered. Firstly,
we check the appropriateness of the model by running diagnostic tests on its residuals. The
tests are satisfied depicting the appropriateness of the model used. Next, we control for
population density. This is done to acknowledge the fact that patterns of urbanization will
be influenced by countries that already have high population density. the results remain
robust to this inclusion. GDP per capita6 is included as a control for the living standard
in a country 7 and the results remain economically and statistically unchanged. Further we
6Test for multicollinearity reveal that none of the VIF estimates are more than 10 implying that there is
no problem of multicollinearity in the model.
7Ideally one should control for the level of income inequality in a country to account for urban agglomer-
ation patterns. However, there is severe lack of data for the income inequality variable, proxied by the GINI
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use an alternative proxy for financial intermediation development, namely M2/M1. ? uses
M2/M1 - the ratio of broad money to narrow money as a proxy for financial sophistication
and links it to human capital and political stability. The paper emphasizes that the ratio of
broad money to narrow money (M2/M1) should be positively related to a country’s level of
financial development. Savings deposits increases more rapidly than transaction balances as
the financial system expands. Following that, the results are tested for our paper and they
remain robust. The results are reported in Table 4.5.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we examine the extent to which the level of a country’s financial development
plays a contributory role in determining the pace of urbanization and urban concentration in
different countries. We hypothesize that the more developed the financial sector will be, the
lower will the growth of urbanization and urban concentration. Our argument is based on the
premise that a developed financial intermediary sector reduces transaction costs, facilitates
trading, and allows economic agents to diversify risks. This eases out locational constraints
enabling individuals to decentralize their activities.
Using a sample of developed and developing countries over the period 1975 - 2005, the
paper shows that a higher level of financial development is associated with a lower growth in
urbanization and urban concentration. The empirical analysis also concludes that the latter
result is mostly driven by the experience observed in developing countries.
Rapid urbanization in most developing countries in the past half century has been charac-
terized by excessively high levels of concentration of the urban population in very large cities.
Such large urban concentrations in developing economies are characterized by poor quality
of life, health hazards and degrading environmental concerns. Urbanization is indispensable
for the industrialization of a country, which in turn is needed for putting it on a trajectory
of growth and development. However, too much or too rapid urbanization is not desirable.
coefficient. The scarcity of this data reduces number of observations and are hence not included in the study
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Some degree of urbanization initially reduces transaction costs and inter- and intra-regional
expenditures. But unplanned and fast paced urbanization is associated with externalities
such as congestion, pollution, overpopulation, etc. As the banking sector develops, especially
in developing in economies, economics agents will find it easier to carry out their economic
functions with less dependence from the city center.
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Figure 4.1: Scatter plot for Whole sample for Share of Urban to Total Population
4 1.pdf
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Figure 4.2: Scatter plot for Whole sample for H-F Index of Urban Concentration
4 2.pdf
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Figure 4.3: Scatter plot for Whole sample for Relative Urban Primacy
4 3.pdf
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Figure 4.4: Scatter plot for Whole sample for Urban Gigantism
4 4.pdf
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Figure 4.5: Scatter plot for Share of Urban to Total Population (Developing Sub-
set)
4 5.pdf
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Figure 4.6: Scatter plot for Share of H-F Index of Urban Concentration (Devel-
oping Subset)
4 6.pdf
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Figure 4.7: Scatter plot for Share of Relative Urban Primacy (Developing Subset)
4 7.pdf
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Figure 4.8: Scatter plot for Share of Urban Gigantism (Developing Subset)
4 8.pdf
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Figure 4.9: Scatter plot for Share of Urban to Total Population (Developed Sub-
set)
4 9.pdf
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Figure 4.10: Scatter plot for Share of H-F Index of Urban Concentration (Devel-
oped Subset)
4 10.pdf
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Figure 4.11: Scatter plot for Share of Relative Urban Primacy (Developed Subset)
4 11.pdf
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Figure 4.12: Scatter plot for Share of Urban Gigantism (Developed Subset)
4 12.pdf
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Figure 4.13: Fitted Graph for Whole Sample
4 13.pdf
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Figure 4.14: Fitted Graph for Whole Sample (with no cross term with Developed
Country Dummy)
4 14.pdf
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Figure 4.15: Fitted Graph for Developing Countries
4 15.pdf
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Figure 4.16: Fitted Graph for Developed countries
4 16.pdf
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Table 4.6: List of Countries
Algeria France Pakistan
Argentina Gabon Panama
Australia Gambia, The Papua New Guinea
Austria Germany Paraguay
Bahamas, The Ghana Peru
Bahrain Greece Philippines
Bangladesh Grenada Poland
Barbados Guatemala Portugal
Belgium Haiti Rwanda
Belize Honduras Saudi Arabia
Benin Hungary Senegal
Bolivia Iceland Seychelles
Botswana India Sierra Leone
Brazil Indonesia Singapore
Bulgaria Iran Solomon Islands
Burkina Faso Ireland South Africa
Burundi Israel Spain
Cameroon Italy Sri Lanka
Canada Jamaica St. Kitts and Nevis
Cape Verde Japan St. Lucia
Central African Republic Jordan St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Chad Kenya Sudan
Chile Korea, Republic Suriname
China Kuwait Swaziland
Colombia Lesotho Sweden
Congo, Rep. Madagascar Switzerland
Costa Rica Malawi Syria
Cote D’ Ivore Malaysia Tanzania
Cyprus Malta Thailand
Denmark Mauritius Togo
Dominica Mexico Tonga
Dominican Rep. Morocco Trinidad and Tobago
Ecuador Myanmar Turkey
Egypt Nepal United Kingdom
El Salvador Netherlands United States
Rquitorial Guinea New Zealand Uruguay
Ethiopia Niger Venezuela
Fiji Nigeria Zambia
Finland Norway Zimbabwe
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Table 4.7: Summary Statistics
sum stat.pdf
 
Variables Mean Standard Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Whole Sample 
H-F Index 1975 -2.37318 0.972393 -5.35807 0 
Growth in H-F index -0.22558 0.424339 -1.62257 0.909109 
Share of Urban Population to Total 1975 -1.04334 0.73517 -3.44202 0 
Growth in Share of Urban Population to Total 0.343196 0.325204 -0.25572 1.581945 
Relative Urban Population 1975 -1.29234 0.590362 -3.08027 -0.00018 
Growth in Relative Urban Population -0.10398 0.225696 -0.72613 0.473243 
Urban Gigantism 1975 -2.23754 0.868474 -4.82897 -0.00018 
Growth in Urban Gigantism 0.233901 0.327334 -0.51733 1.444853 
(Liquid Liability/GDP) 1975 -1.20091 0.608651 -2.81938 0.457196 
GDP per capita (constant US $ 2000) 7.434433 1.496411 4.638243 10.17696 
EXP/GDP 3.208166 0.709483 1.063012 4.821156 
Value Added of Agriculture 2.72422 1.054412 -1.60944 4.273268 
Telephone Mainlines (per 1000) 2.872733 1.86077 -0.90748 6.2417 
FDI inflow/GDP -0.50904 1.798426 -6.52605 3.224232 
Developing Countries 
H-F Index 1975 -2.32265 0.846892 -4.72745 -0.94001 
Growth in H-F index -0.28252 0.444236 -1.62257 0.729796 
Share of Urban Population to Total 1975 -1.27201 0.708817 -3.44202 -0.16252 
Growth in Share of Urban Population to Total 0.421365 0.336407 -0.25572 1.581945 
Relative Urban Population 1975 -1.25201 0.535878 -3.08027 -0.46887 
Growth in Relative Urban Population -0.13129 0.235025 -0.72613 0.366219 
Urban Gigantism 1975 -2.45697 0.84941 -4.82897 -0.87608 
Growth in Urban Gigantism 0.311004 0.352668 -0.51733 1.444853 
(Liquid Liability/GDP) 1975 -1.38864 0.536868 -2.81938 -0.33639 
GDP per capita (constant US $ 2000) 6.813254 1.146017 4.638243 9.627213 
EXP/GDP 3.174034 0.759442 1.063012 4.821156 
Value Added of Agriculture 3.039064 0.831696 -0.06872 4.273268 
Telephone Mainlines (per 1000) 2.050239 1.410518 -0.90748 4.793558 
FDI inflow/GDP -0.46789 1.925561 -6.52605 3.224232 
Developed Countries 
H-F Index 1975 -2.49041 1.227486 -5.35807 0 
Growth in H-F index -0.09348 0.347146 -0.79868 0.909109 
Share of Urban Population to Total 1975 -0.38019 0.245256 -0.89649 0 
Growth in Share of Urban Population to Total 0.116506 0.126225 0 0.520776 
Relative Urban Population 1975 -1.38231 0.700131 -2.87491 -0.00018 
Growth in Relative Urban Population -0.04305 0.193867 -0.48634 0.473243 
Urban Gigantism 1975 -1.74804 0.705825 -3.19374 -0.00018 
Growth in Urban Gigantism 0.0619 0.166115 -0.30624 0.520153 
(Liquid Liability/GDP) 1975 -0.66277 0.469209 -1.48667 0.457196 
GDP per capita (constant US $ 2000) 9.276551 0.655906 7.819807 10.17696 
EXP/GDP 3.309386 0.533267 2.144836 4.416556 
Value Added of Agriculture 1.801402 1.108494 -1.60944 3.300715 
Telephone Mainlines (per 1000) 5.148301 0.67355 3.400862 6.2417 
FDI inflow/GDP -0.60355 1.494869 -5.84873 1.739461 
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
The essays of my dissertation explore and emphasize roles good institutions have in the
context of economic development. As mentioned in the beginning, good institutions is what
explains the vast difference in performance of countries across the globe. Keeping in mind
that, the essays in the dissertation identifies factors that can lead to establishment of good
institutions and elaborates how presence of good institutions can alter developmental out-
comes in countries. The general consensus of these essays is thus that good institutions are
the necessity for countries to fulfill their developmental objectives.
The first essay establishes that higher inflow of FDI to an economy has a positive spillover
effect on its media sector. It significantly enhances media freedom. FDI in an economy
strengthens all its institutions and the general socio-economic framework. The higher level
of FDI inflow within a country has its share of impact on media sector as well, which is
one of the most important and sensitive institutions. The positive spill-over effect works by
removing information asymmetry, bringing financial independence, bestowing technological
superiority, enhancing quality and reach and raising public awareness. These, in turn, pave
the way for a free and potent media. The results establish FDI inflow as an important
contributor to media freedom. The higher the flow of FDI into an economy, the free-er and
more efficient is the media.
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The second essay iterates the importance of a free press in the context of combating the
most dreadful threat faced by countries in current times - terrorism. Considering the case
of transnational terrorism, the robust analysis presented above establishes that a free press
does have a mitigating impact on terrorism. The importance of the paper extends further to
substantiate that, though a democracy has often been criticized to be terror-inviting, when
empowered by a free press, the two together have a strong terror dampening effect. The
analysis is not only important as it upholds the importance of having a free press and a
sound democracy, but also establishes how important it is to empower a democracy with a
free press and this definitely has sound policy implications. This is especially for countries
weaker on either front as also for all countries plagued by threats or actual incidents of
terrorism. It also refutes the doubt that lurked about the role of a free press in dealing with
the 26/11 terror incident in India. Considering the detailed analysis, it can be safely claimed
that the free press led to a positive impact at the end of it, if anything.
The third essay examines the extent to which the level of a country’s financial develop-
ment plays a contributory role in determining the pace of urbanization and urban concentra-
tion in different countries. The analysis shows that a higher level of financial development
is associated with a lower growth in urbanization and urban concentration. The empirical
analysis also concludes that the latter result is mostly driven by the experience observed
in developing countries. Given that developing nations in the past decades have witnessed
excess and fast paced urbanization and concentration, it is an important insight to see that
development of the financial intermediary sector can help the countries decongest and embark
on a process of desired and structured urbanization.
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